

2

How Are Stigma Processes Related to Different Aspects of Migration-Generated Diversity?

Drew Blasco, Bruce G. Link, Andrea Bohman,
Tyrone A. Forman, Anastasia Gorodzeisky, John E.
Pachankis, Georg Schomerus, and Lawrence H. Yang

Abstract

Research in the fields of migration and stigma have much to offer each other yet to date, collaboration has been lacking. When migration occurs, diversity is generated. Inherent in this “migration-generated diversity” is the key role that the “movement” of people or the political boundaries around them plays in outcomes such as prejudice, stigma, and discrimination. Under certain conditions, migration-generated diversity may result in prejudice (a concept historically used more often by the migration field), stigma, or a combination of prejudice and stigma (or neither). To advance dialogue between these fields, this chapter presents a “conceptual mapping tool,” developed to assist researchers as they formulate questions to be addressed by the migration field for which stigma frameworks and perspectives may better inform results. In addition, three theoretical perspectives—group threat theory, intersectionality, and “what matters most,” some of which were selected from the conceptual mapping tool are discussed, presenting key examples to elucidate the implications of migration-generated diversity and stigma. Future research should (a) explore additional ways to conceptualize the relationship between stigma concepts and migration-generated diversity, (b) evaluate the tool’s utility in relation to migration-related phenomena, and (c) develop more precise ways to measure relevant concepts with the aim of generating more informed and tailored interventions to reduce the impacts of prejudice, discrimination, and stigma.

Introduction

How the stigma and migration research fields can inform one another is an important question yet these two fields have rarely been in conversation to date. Understanding how these research fields may inform one another is crucial

to better contextualize the lived experience of migrants given that the movement of people and boundaries has been one of the defining characteristics of humans across time. Throughout our discussions, we sought to set the stage regarding concepts, theories, and frameworks that might be useful to scholars working at the intersection of these two fields, yet who may be unfamiliar with such important concepts for their research agendas. A better understanding of the key concepts, theories, and frameworks from both the stigma and migration fields is crucial to inform research seeking to understand the impacts of “migration-generated diversity.” In this chapter, we present several topics from the migration and stigma fields that we determined were particularly important for the integration of these two fields.

We begin by pointing to the overarching importance of “movement” for the scholarship that we hope will result from the intersection of these two fields. To achieve a merging of fields, it is critically important to create a shared understanding of how to think about ways in which prejudice and stigma may, under a certain set of conditions in a specific time and place, emerge from the movement of people through migration. To inform each field about the core concepts and theories that an emerging focus on “migration-related stigma” might have, we created a conceptual mapping tool (see pp. 23–26). In addition to creating a conceptual mapping tool, we selected three theoretical perspectives, some from this tool, to further engage: group threat theory, intersectionality, and “what matters most.” We selected these theoretical perspectives because they provide generative lenses through which migration-related stigma can be considered and may help to further elucidate how stigma processes may change over time. We conclude by providing suggestions aimed at moving research at the intersection of stigma and migration forward.

Setting the Stage: Defining Key Concepts to Understand Migration-Generated Diversity

The Role of Movement

What is the role of movement in migration-generated diversity and its relationship to stigma? To preface this section, we briefly introduce several basic migration-related terms (migrants, immigrants, emigrants, international migrants, and internal migrants) critical for understanding differences in experiences of prejudice, discrimination, and stigma, including their specific nuances to ensure a shared understanding of these terms for the following discussion of the role of movement in the framework of migration-related prejudice and stigma. The general term *migrant* is used here to refer to individuals who changed their country of residence at least for a certain period of time. This allows issues to be discussed from both the point of view of the country of origin and the country of destination. Comparatively, *immigrant* is used mostly from a point of

view of a country of destination, or what is often termed the receiving country. *Immigrants* are classified as individuals who arrived in such receiving countries, wherein a part of the local population may hold anti-immigrant attitudes. In addition, the term *immigrants* is more often used to describe permanent immigrants (i.e., individuals who arrived with the intention to settle permanently in the country of destination), as compared to *temporal migrants* (e.g., labor migrants, student migrants). *Emigrant* is a concept used from a point of view of the country of origin: people who leave their country of origin are emigrants in the eyes of those who stayed behind. To further elucidate this, *immigration* is arriving in a country of destination and *emigration* is leaving a country of origin. Migration, thus, is a relatively flexible and general concept that allows for discussion of diverse patterns of migration (including multiple migration, circular migration, return migration, temporal migration¹) as well as different points of view.

An additional distinction between *international migrants* and *internal migrants* is important to the discussion of movement and migration-related stigma. *International migrants* are typically defined as individuals who migrated or moved from one sovereign state (i.e., their country of birth or country of origin) to another sovereign state (i.e., their current country of residence or country of destination). When conceptualizing the change of one's place of residence within a sovereign state, the term *internal migrant* is used (e.g., when a person does not cross national borders at the time of migration).

In the research literature on prejudice and stigma, there is often an overlap in how the terms international migrant and ethnic/racial minorities are used. Yet not all ethnic/racial minorities are international migrants, and not all international migrants are ethnic/racial minorities. Thus, we sought to first focus on what we argue is key to understanding migration-related stigma; namely, movement. *Does movement invoke essential features of stigma?* We argue that movement from one country to another is an essential feature of how migration-related stigma may develop and therefore discuss three types of movement as routes through which migration and migration-related stigma may occur: (a) movement of people across national borders, (b) movement of borders around people, and (c) movement and racial/ethnic minorities. Further, we directly address the issue of whether there is a useful distinction between

¹ Yet, some scholars also questioned the term migration (Urry 2007) because it implies permanent or long-term migration from one sovereign state to another, in other words, patterns of migration, such as labor migration and settlement migration, that mostly characterized the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Castles 2016). Defining the twenty-first century as an era of technological and communication advances, transnationalism, fluidity and openness, these scholars have used "mobility" as a theoretical concept that better fits the description of diverse large-scale and small-scale movements of people in the twenty-first century (Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2007). Here we use the term "migration" to describe the diverse patterns and pathways of people movements from one country to another and adopt Castles's (2016) view of migration as a regular part of social relations and "a part of complex and varied processes of societal change" (Castles 2016:22).

migrant groups and ethnic/racial minority groups within the study of majority population attitudes (prejudice, stigma) toward them.

Movement of People across National Borders

We refer to the *movement of people across national borders* as a movement from a country of origin to a country of destination with the intention to reside at least for a certain period in the latter. This type of movement, however, can happen for different purposes. Migration can be forced or voluntary and for diverse reasons. People may, for instance, seek asylum, better employment possibilities, or educational or professional advancement. They may strive for a better lifestyle or improved living conditions (e.g., retirement migration) or pursue personal reasons (e.g., marriage, family reunification, return migration, co-ethnic repatriation).

In our conceptualization of the prejudice and stigma generated by this type of movement, we suggest that prejudice toward migrants be viewed from the point of view of a country of destination (stigmatization of immigration) as well as from the perspective of a country of origin (stigmatization of emigration). Not only immigration, but also emigration from a country is perceived as a problem in the country that is being left (Kustov 2022). Emigrants may be stigmatized or suffer from prejudice in their country of origin even though they may belong to an ethnic majority in that country. In this case, the act of migration itself, as a movement across national borders, may evoke prejudice. From the perspective of the country of origin, emigration can be stigmatized to achieve norm enforcement: people should stay in a place where they are born and contribute to that place (Phelan et al. 2008).

Goodhart's (2017) conceptualization of British citizens as "anywheres" or "somerwheres," which he put forth in his analysis of why Britain voted to leave the European Union, may be helpful when thinking about prejudice toward migrants as people who moved across national borders regardless of their ethnicity. "Anywheres" are cosmopolitans who are ready to live in different countries, embrace pluralism, respect diversity, and are open to change (Goodhart 2017). By contrast, "somerwheres" resist change and cherish their national identity and cultural homogeneity of their society and place of birth (Goodhart 2017). These people prefer to stay in the community, are less open to cultural complexity, and are concerned about their collective borders (Goodhart 2017). Following Goodhart's (2017) argument, for "somerwheres," migration (i.e., movement of people across borders of sovereign states or even across regions within national states) can be disturbing, regardless of the migrants' ethnicity. Thus, "somerwheres" will often hold prejudicial views and may stigmatize migrants to keep them away, thereby controlling the borders of their own collective. They may hold prejudice against both immigrants and emigrants. "Anywheres," however, tend to view migration and its consequences as valuable rather than threatening (Goodhart 2017). In other words, some people

(“anywheres”) view the movement of people across borders, regardless of migrants’ ethnicity, as beneficial, whereas others (“somewheres”) perceive it to be intimidating (Goodhart 2017).

Movement of Borders around People

We refer here to the movement of borders as geopolitical changes and state formation. Although the political reality of the Global North is composed of autonomous nation units with borders that have remained relatively stable since the end of World War II, this does not apply for other parts of the world over the last several decades. For example, following the dissolution of former communist/socialist federations at the end of the twentieth century, 24 independent states were (re)established along new territorial borders. In addition, consider the ethnic enclave exchange between India and Bangladesh in 2015 in which Indian ethnic enclaves in Bangladesh were swapped for Bangladeshi enclaves in India.

What consequences exist when borders, but not people, move? In Europe, for example, the category of standardized international migrant includes a large number of people who did not actually cross international borders at the time of their migration. These people were born in one of the three federations (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) and migrated from one republic of a federation to another republic of the same federation during the period when the republics were part of the same federal sovereign state. Later, these individuals were named international migrants according to OECD, World Bank Indicators, and Eurostat data sets, not because they moved from one sovereign state to another, but because the international borders moved around them as new post-socialist nation-states were (re)established. In other words, the category of international migrant, defined as a person born abroad according to present-day borders, may now also include people who migrated internally within the borders of one sovereign state (Gorodzeisky and Leykin 2022). Individuals who did not cross international borders are referred to as international migrants, and under certain conditions they may suffer as a group from prejudice and discrimination. Such a label may be used to legitimize exclusionary citizenship policies toward them, such as happened to Russian-speaking residents in Estonia and Latvia (Gorodzeisky and Leykin 2022). Furthermore, movement of borders may make a certain population group extremely vulnerable to stigma and discrimination, due to the loss of legal status following the movement of borders, as the case of “erased” residents in Slovenia demonstrates (Pistotnik and Brown 2018). The negative consequences of stigma for people who did not migrate internationally but were labeled as international migrants may be particularly severe since these individuals are denied agency: they did not intend to migrate internationally or to cross international borders yet are still labeled as international migrants and may be treated as such after the borders changed.

Movement and Racial/Ethnic Minorities

In the conceptualization of movement and its relationship to migration-related stigma, it is important to consider whether it is solely movement that results in stigma. Does prejudice exist toward migrants as outsiders, as foreigners, as people who moved from a country of birth to live in another country, or are migrants only stigmatized if they belong to an ethnic/racial minority? Is there a useful distinction between migrant groups and ethnic minority groups when we study prejudice or stigma? Our group discussion provided different responses for different social contexts.

In the context of the United States, the distinction between migrant groups and racialized groups may not be quite as useful in the study of stigmatization in certain contexts. In the United States, nowadays, Black and White people are commonly perceived as nonimmigrants, whereas Asian and Latino/a people are frequently perceived as immigrants, even in the third generation (Fussell 2014; Zhou 2004). Comparatively, in the contemporary European context, the situation is different. There is a distinction between being a migrant and being a member of an ethnic or racialized minority in the framework of public attitudes toward these groups. Race can be a signifier of migration background, but it is only one signifier (e.g., language may be another one). There are many European-origin migrants in different European countries who may be stigmatized as migrants but not as a racialized minority.

Another example of migrant groups, which are distinct from ethnic minorities but still experience prejudice, are ethnic German repatriates to Germany or ethnic Greek repatriates to Greece. These immigrants belong to the same ethnic groups as the majority population, but the majority population in Germany and Greece still hold prejudice against these migrant groups (e.g., Matejskova and Leitner 2011 for Germany; Pratsinakis 2014 for Greece). In European contexts as well as in Israel, there is an important distinction in the study of prejudice between ethnic minority groups and migrant groups.

While these examples provide evidence for our argument that there is something unique about the contribution of movement to migration-related stigma, we acknowledge that just because movement may generate stigma, the thrust of the stigma faced by migrants also involves racial/ethnic stigma as well as other markers of difference.

Stigma versus Prejudice

The concepts of stigma versus prejudice have been examined in prior literature, with Phelan et al. (2008) concluding that there are many similarities between these two conceptualizations. Similarly, although scholars from the fields of migration studies and stigma lack a shared understanding of terminology, they share the essence of the types of experiences these separate fields utilize to explain the phenomenon which occurs following migration-generated

diversity. In other words, the concepts of stigma and prejudice, clearly overlap but have developed in the context of different literatures: stigma is more likely to be applied in the context of illness (mental illness, HIV, leprosy) or “deviant” behaviors (LGBTQ, sex work), whereas prejudice is more likely to be used in race relations (White racism) or religious animus (anti-Semitism) (Phelan et al. 2008). Despite this difference, Phelan et al. (2008) concluded that the issue of whether “stigma and prejudice: one animal or two” could be answered, for the most part, as “one animal” (Phelan et al. 2008:358). Their review led to the conclusion that concepts and theories could generally be translated from one framework to another with little loss of meaning. In our group’s discussions, exchanges between migration researchers (who generally used the concept of prejudice) and stigma researchers led to several observations about the correspondences and differences. Bohman et al. (this volume) discusses this by comparing Blumer’s (1958) threat theory to Link and Phelan’s (2001) conceptualization of stigma. Drawing from Bohman et al.’s arguments and our conceptual analysis, we conclude that consistent with Link and Phelan (2001), stigma is a broad umbrella concept that constitutes multiple components; stigma is considered to be present when components of labeling, stereotyping, setting apart, status loss, and discrimination occur together. Further, to accomplish consequential discrimination, stigma requires power to affix labels, confer stereotypes, implement separation, achieve the diminution of status, and exert control over access to jobs, housing, education, and medical care. This concept of stigma (Link and Phelan 2001) differs from the way prejudice is used in the migration literature in its broader bundling of associated concepts, as further developed below. In the stigma definition, an additional difference lies in the centrality of power. It takes power to stigmatize and consequently, powerful groups are often exempted from full-blown stigma. Therefore, even if they may be recipients of labels and stereotypes, powerful groups do not often experience extensive separation, status loss, or discrimination and are thus not subject to stigma (Link and Phelan 2001). In addition to the bundling of concepts and the focus on power, stigma researchers were more likely to investigate the consequences of stigmatization for the targets of such stigmatization.

Given the importance of the concept of prejudice in the migration studies field, let us review the ways in which it has been defined. As previously noted, the migration studies field has often utilized concepts of threat and prejudice to examine the reactions and consequences generated due to migration. Historically, prejudice has been conceived by social scientists as an individual-level phenomenon (see Allport 1954). Conceptualizing it at the individual level suggests that “the individual is a unit separable from ‘society’” (Williams 1988:345). A common criticism of this view of prejudice is that it ignores the larger social structure and power dynamics (see Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999; Bobo and Tuan 2006; Jackman 1994). Blumer (1958) provides a useful framework for thinking about prejudice as a normal human action rooted in an individual’s defense of

his or her group position. This perspective locates the study of prejudice at both individual and group levels. Conceptualizing prejudice in this way provides important leverage for the study of stigma and migration. It also allows scholars to understand the deep and dynamic connection between micro-level psychological processes and meso- and macro-level social structural dynamics. Prejudice, we suggest, not only involves views held by one individual against another: it reflects the social structural relations between groups.

To conclude, differences between the concepts of prejudice and stigma have been examined extensively (e.g., Link and Phelan 2001; Phelan et al. 2008). If taken together, stigma is a broad conceptual scheme or framework that covers an entire process, starting with labeling differences and resulting in devaluation and discrimination. Prejudice, which is closely related to stereotyping and negative emotional reactions in the stigma literature, covers these central aspects of stigma, but does not, as a concept, generally include consequences like discrimination. It is important to note that discrimination has been extensively examined in the migration literature, as a separate construct from prejudice. Considering the overlap and distinctions between the terminology that is utilized by these two fields, we pulled together the most useful concepts and constructs from both fields and developed a conceptual mapping tool to enable scholars to contextualize future research questions and to respond to urgent issues related to stigma associated with migration diversity. This conceptual mapping tool (Table 2.1) is meant to provide researchers a broad tool that may aid them in selecting the most useful and appropriate concepts relevant to their particular area of research. It is not meant to be exhaustive and researchers utilizing it should decide what “dimensions” are most relevant for their particular research questions. It is meant to provide a collection of potentially useful concepts from the stigma and migration literature. Every situation involving migration stigma is likely to be different and as a result readers should use the conceptual mapping tool to identify concepts that might possibly be useful. In the future it is possible that integrated models for particular forms of migration stigma might emerge but currently the best use of our conceptual mapping tool is to suggest possibilities that users of this tool can creatively deploy.

The Conceptual Mapping Tool

Table 2.1 captures the core “dimensions” of relevant concepts from the stigma and migration fields. In it you will find the concept’s name (Column 1), a brief description of the concept and citation(s) to consult for further information (Column 2), and, when relevant, suggested measures to operationalize the concept (Column 3). The dimensions or groupings of concepts are organized to address specific aspects of stigma/prejudice. We briefly describe the overall dimensions of relevant concepts below but encourage researchers to consider Columns 2 and 3 to gain an in-depth understanding of these concepts.

Table 2.1 This conceptual mapping tool provides a way to understand migration-generated diversity. Integral concepts, which need to be considered within their historical and social contexts, are listed, followed by brief descriptions and suggestions for further reading. Measures by which to evaluate each component are given where available.

Concept	Description; Further Reading	Suggested Measures
<i>Components of Stigma</i>		
Othering (“Us” vs. “Them”)	Separation into distinct and unequal groups; Link and Phelan (2001), Tajfel and Turner (1979), and for alternative terminology Allport (1954)	Continuum measures (Peter et al. 2021)
Prejudice	A negative attitude directed toward a group or an individual belonging to the group; Allport (1954)	Subtle and blatant prejudice scale (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995)
Emotional reactions	Anger, fear, disgust; Link et al. (2004)	Emotional Reactions to Mental Illness Scale, ERMIS (Angermeyer et al. 2010)
Status Loss	Downward placement in social hierarchies; Link and Phelan (2001)	
Stereotype	Generalization of (negative) characteristics, sometimes conceived of as the cognitive component of prejudice; Link and Phelan (2001)	Attribution Questionnaire (Corrigan et al. 2014)
Labeling	Designation or tag selected for social salience; Link and Phelan (2001)	Responses to open-ended questions about mental illness or a described mental illness are coded to create measures (e.g., Angermeyer and Matschinger 2003)
Power	Stigma cannot be exercised in the absence of power; Link and Phelan (2001)	
<i>Levels of Stigma</i>		
Intrapersonal	Impacts thoughts, emotions, behavioral reactions of those stigmatized, e.g., due to anticipated stigma or self-stigma; Major and O’Brien (2005)	For separate measures of anticipated and internalized stigma (Link et al. 2015)
Self-Stigma	Driven by the attitudes of the stigmatized individual, internalizing and application of prevalent negative stereotypes leads to a decrease in self-esteem and self-efficacy, shame, and embarrassment; Corrigan et al. (2011), Meyer (1995)	Self-Stigma of Mental Illness Scale (Corrigan et al. 2011) Internalized Homophobia (Meyer 1995) Internalized Stigma Scale (Ritsher et al. 2003) Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness (Link et al. 2015)
Interpersonal	Discriminatory behavior by individuals toward individuals based on one’s membership in a socially disadvantaged group, also referred to as public stigma; Link et al. (2004)	Social distance scale (Link et al. 1987) Measure of discrimination (Meyer 1995) Scale of Daily Indignities (Link and Phelan 2014)
Structural	Manifested through laws, policies, and allocation of rights and resources; Hatzenbuehler (2016)	Measure of preferences for forms of structural discrimination (e.g., Schomerus et al. 2022)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Concept	Description; Further Reading	Suggested Measures
<i>Subject of Stigma Assessment</i>		
The stigmatizer	General public, members of the majority, members of the in-group	
The person stigmatized	Migrants	
Associations	People connected to the stigmatized person (e.g., relatives, helpers); courtesy stigma; Goffman (1963)	Affiliate Stigma Scale (Mak and Cheung 2008)
<i>Types of Stigma Experiences</i>		
Enacted	Discrimination as an outcome of public or structural stigma; Earnshaw and Chaudoir (2009)	
Anticipated	Anticipated stigma, irrespective of whether it will actually happen or not; Link (1987), Pinel (1999)	Stigma-consciousness questionnaire (Pinel 1999; Link and Phelan 2014) Rejection sensitivity questionnaire (Downey and Feldman 1996)
Avoided	Putting yourself at a disadvantage by avoiding situations where stigmatization could occur, label avoidance; Earnshaw and Chaudoir (2009), Link et al. (1989)	Modified HIV stigma scale (Saine et al. 2020; Wanjala et al. 2021) Withdrawal scale (Link et al. 1989)
<i>Causes/Functions of Stigma</i>		
1. Threat		
Levels:	To individual interests; Bobo (1983) To group interests of an individual; Scheepers et al. (2002)	Individual level (economic) (Raijman and Semyonov 2004)
Dimensions (economic, political, cultural)	What Matters Most; Yang et al. (2007). In-group; and Citrin (2007) General anxiety, unspecific fear related to discomfort, lack of predictability, control; Raijman and Semyonov (2004)	Individual and group level (economic) (Gorodzeisky 2013) Group level (economic and cultural) (Heath et al. 2020)
2. Function		
To dominate and exploit	Defense against a perceived threat to securing or expanding power, status, wealth of the dominant group; Phelan et al. (2008)	Measures relevant to these concepts are included in other boxes. For example, a measure of discrimination captures the function of domination and exploitation.
To enforce norms	Penalizing deviant behavior, signaling the boundaries of acceptable behavior; Phelan et al. (2008). What does it take, e.g., to be Swedish? To what extent do immigrants need to know the language?	Rejection or social distance measures capture punishment of norm violating behavior as well as keeping people away.
To exclude	Avoidance of danger, increasing perceived security, avoidance of disease; Phelan et al. (2008). Opposition to immigration, desire for social distance; Heath et al. (2020)	

Table 2.1 (continued)

Concept	Description; Further Reading	Suggested Measures
<i>Difference between Stigmatized Circumstances</i>		
Peril	Perceived dangerousness; Angermeyer and Matschinger (1996), Link et al. (1999), Jones et al. (1984), Pachankis et al. (2018)	Link and Cullen (1986) multi-item scale
Disruptiveness	Awkwardness in social interactions by virtue of non-smooth traits or attributes; Hebl et al. (2000), Jones et al. (1984), Pachankis et al. (2018)	Social distance scale (Link et al. 1987)
Origin	Blaming people for their stigmatized condition; onset and offset responsibility can be distinguished; Weiner (1995), Corrigan (2000), Jones et al. (1984), Pachankis et al. (2018)	Attribution questionnaire (Corrigan et al. 2014)
Aesthetics	Invoking disgust through visible marks; Crandall and Moriarty (1995), Jones et al. (1984), Pachankis et al. (2018)	Social distance scale (Link et al. 1987)
Course	Presence of stigma at birth; emergence and persistence later in life; Levy and Pilver (2012), Jones et al. (1984); Pachankis et al. (2018)	
Concealment	Obscurement under specific situations; Pachankis (2007), Jones et al. (1984), Pachankis et al. (2018)	Modified HIV stigma scale (Saine et al. 2020; Wanjala et al. 2021)
<i>Consequences of Stigma</i>		
Discrimination	Unjust or prejudicial treatment of a person or group based on a label or designation affixed to them; Williams et al. (1997)	Everyday Discrimination Scale (Williams et al. 1997)
Devaluation	Downward placement as a person of worth or value; Goffman (1963), Link et al. (2004), Yang et al. (2007)	Perceived Discrimination and Devaluation Scale (Link 1987)
Exclusion	Blocking people from access or participation in desired circumstances; Priebe et al. (2008)	SIX (objective social outcome index) (Priebe et al. 2008)
Life chances	Probability that certain circumstances (housing, jobs, schooling) can be achieved; Savage (2015)	
Physical/mental health		Symptom checklists like SCL-90 (Derogatis 1994)
<i>Stigma Reduction</i>		
Covering	Hiding a (concealable) stigmatized condition or identity; Yoshino (2006)	Secrecy measure (Link et al. 1989)
Coping	Using personal resources and strategies to be able to cope with stigma and its consequences; Miller and Kaiser (2001)	Coping with discrimination scales (modified from other stigmatized groups, e.g., LGBTQ)
Resistance	Efforts by stigmatized individuals to counter the effects of their stigmatization by denying the labels and stereotypes applied to them or by challenging claims of those who would stigmatize them; Thoits (2011)	Subscale Stigma Resistance of the Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness scale (Ritsher et al. 2003). Stigma resistance scales (Thoits and Link 2016; Thoits 2016)
Contact	Contact needs to be established in a targeted, credible, local, and continuous manner; Allport (1954), Corrigan (2011)	Familiarity scale (Corrigan et al. 2001). Contact with persons with mental illness scale (Link and Cullen 1986)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Concept	Description; Further Reading	Suggested Measures
<i>What Matters Most</i>		
Local worlds	The embeddedness of individuals in networks that constitute a context of shared meaning and understanding; Yang et al. (2007)	Cultural Factors Shape Stigma (CFSS) and Cultural Capabilities Protect against Stigma scales (CCPS) (Yang et al. 2021)
Core personhood	That which is essential for an individual to be a full participating member of a local world; Yang et al. (2007)	CFSS and CCPS scales (Yang et al. 2021)

The first dimension, “components of stigma,” seeks to specify what must be present for an investigator to indicate that a circumstance is “stigmatized” or that “prejudice” exists. For stigma, these components are labeling, stereotyping, setting apart, emotional reactions, status loss, and discrimination, in the context of power and wherein these components exist at least to some degree (Link and Phelan 2001; Link et al. 2004). Prejudice is defined as antipathy focused on an individual or a group that is based on an overgeneralization (Allport 1954). The utility of this set of concepts in any stigma domain, including migration, would be to provide a type of checklist for a researcher to apply:

- Are there pejorative labels? Attendant stereotypes? Accompanying emotions?
- Is there an in-group/out-group or us versus them separation?
- Do the recipients experience status loss and are they discriminated against?

Attending to these concepts can help sensitize the researcher to what may be important to investigate.

The second dimension, “levels of stigma,” points to various levels at which stigma may occur. Its aim is to alert investigators to the possibility that stigma, for both perpetrators and recipients, can be expressed or experienced at multiple levels. Stigma-related processes can operate within a person (intrapersonally), between people (interpersonally), or at the structural level (structural stigma). A special component that has been emphasized in the stigma field is “self-stigma,” in which a person internalizes stereotypes and risks experiencing a self-esteem decrement as a result (Corrigan et al. 2011).

The third dimension, “subject of stigma assessment,” indicates that the study of stigma and of migration-related stigma can be focused on groups that differ in their relationship to the stigmatized circumstance being examined. Thus, it can involve potential stigmatizers, or what the stigma field sometimes refers to as “public” stigma. Alternatively, it can involve the recipients of stigma. Finally, people connected to the stigmatized person may experience “courtesy” stigma (Goffman 1963)—in the stigma literature, this is commonly referred to as “associative stigma” or “vicarious” in the migration literature.

The fourth dimension, “types of experiences of stigma,” can help sensitize investigators to the possibility that stigma may be experienced in multiple ways, as people can experience the enactment of stigma by others, the anticipation of stigma that may or may not ultimately occur, and avoidance stigma that results when a person cuts off potentially beneficial outcomes for fear of encountering enacted stigma. This can help investigators better understand that stigma, in general, or migration-level stigma can be experienced in multiple ways and thus may result in multiple unexpected consequences.

In the fifth dimension, “causes/functions of stigma,” we identify sources of stigma/prejudice. The concept of threat, as it has been applied in the migration field, can be conceptualized as applying individual or collective interests and includes threat to multiple dimensions, including economic, political, cultural, and security aspects (Bobo 1983; Scheepers et al. 2002). The threat component is clearly highly relevant to migration, as it was developed as a theoretical explanation for prejudice and discrimination directed to migrant groups. The stigma literature has also developed potentially relevant concepts related to desired ends that stigma can bring to those who stigmatize. These include domination/exploitation, norm enforcement or control of others, and exclusions or what is called, “keeping people down” (exploitation/domination), “keeping people in” (norm enforcement), or “keeping people away” (exclusion) (Phelan et al. 2008:362). In this framework, stigma functions to get the dominant group things they want; because of this, it creates and sustains the enactment of stigma in all its forms and at all levels. These concepts are potentially useful for migration stigma as they point to circumstances in which efforts are in place to keep people in (e.g., burkas) or keep people down to exploit them (e.g., migrant workers).

The next dimension of concepts, “difference between stigmatized circumstances,” addresses the fact that circumstances that are stigmatized are often very different from one another—the term stigma is applied to everything from racial stigma to irritable bowel syndrome to prostitution. Although these different circumstances have stigmatization in common, it is also clear that they are very different. Here Jones et al. (1984) and Pachankis et al. (2018) point out that stigmatized circumstances differ in terms of whether they can be concealed (racial differences vs. mental illness), involve peril (incarceration history vs. blindness), are disruptive in taken-for-granted interactions (facial disfigurement vs. sexual minority status), and involve aesthetic qualities (leprosy vs. abortion recipient) or whether the origin of the circumstance is controlled by the person (substance use vs. Down syndrome) or the course of the stigmatizing circumstance can be altered (cleft lip vs. having dwarfism).

The experience of stigma differs radically according to these dimensions. For the field of migration stigma, these concepts are potentially useful for reasoning about how different migration circumstances may differ. For example, different situations involving migration may or may not involve peril, disruptiveness of taken-for-granted interaction, or aesthetics. In some circumstances,

migrants might be able to conceal their origins, in others not. Similarly, the issue of origin may be important in terms of whether the migrating person chose to migrate and may also be useful to consider regarding when, over the life course, migration occurred.

The next dimension contains potential “consequences of stigmatization” which in the stigma field have included the broad scope of life chances from jobs, housing, health care, educational opportunities, social relationship, self-esteem, and physical and mental health. To understand the experience of the migrant, these domains may represent useful possible outcomes for the migration field to consider.

The next dimension, “stigma reduction,” involves efforts to mitigate or resist the impact of stigmatization. In the stigma field, individual-level coping efforts involve covering/concealment, educating others about one’s situation, avoiding/withdrawing to reduce exposure to anticipated/enacted stigma, distancing oneself from others who are stigmatized (“I am not like them”), and effortful coping aimed at countering stereotypes (working twice as hard) (Miller and Kaiser 2001; Yoshino 2006; Link et al. 1989). Resistance strategies can involve individual strategies, such as deflecting (stereotypes exist but “that is not me”) or challenging others when they enact stigma, as well as social strategies, such as joining social movements (for further discussion on these coping strategies, see Misra et al., this volume). All these coping and resistance strategies are potentially useful in migration studies, especially if attention is turned to the consequences for people who have migrated.

The final dimension is the “what matters most theory/conceptual scheme.” In the stigma literature, its value lies in the conceptualization of cultural circumstances and in the idea that stigma is most impactful when it challenges the lived engagements that are “most at stake” (or “what matters most”) to people in their local worlds (Yang et al. 2007). We expand on this approach below, as it holds the potential to integrate the stigma and migration fields, where life activities that “matter most” in the migrant group may cohere or lie in opposition to what is most valued by dominant groups in the receiving society.

This brief overview of the conceptual mapping tool (Table 2.1) points to its potential usefulness for the migration and stigma fields. Still, we acknowledge the complexity and scale of the conceptual mapping tool. We encourage scholars in these fields to take what is most applicable to their specific research questions to better conceptualize migration-related stigma. To better facilitate the use of this conceptual mapping tool, Table 2.2 provides an example of how a researcher might utilize particular concepts from it.

Sample Application of the Conceptual Mapping Tool

Due to its comprehensive approach, the conceptual mapping tool offers a way to study the migrant experience and social positions for a specific group of migrants (e.g., by country of origin, legal status). Applying the conceptual

Table 2.2 An overview of levels of stigma and types of stigma experiences in migration-related stigma.

Type	Public Level	Structural Level	Self-Stigma
Enacted	Individual discrimination	Disadvantaged by law Discriminatory migration policies Unequal access to health care	Shame Self-devaluation Why-try effect
Anticipated	Stress and its sequelae	Stress and its sequelae	Stress and its sequelae
Avoided	Conceal migration status Social withdrawal Choose to change name to resemble the in-group Avoid speaking in mother tongue in public	Select destination country with low structural stigma Conceal immigration status Avoid complaining if treated unfairly Tolerate unfair labor or housing conditions Avoid seeking health care Avoid calling the police when victimized by crime	Avoid speaking in mother tongue in public Deny one's cultural heritage Choose to change name to resemble the in-group Avoid immigrant communities

mapping tool, we can examine structural, interpersonal, and intrapersonal manifestations of stigma in the case of a specific migrant group. Having such a multilevel examination would enhance our understanding of the integration outcomes for a specific migrant group and enable us to examine migration laws and policies that target this specific group (structural manifestation), discriminatory behavior toward this group (interpersonal manifestation), as well as the impact that stigma has on self-evaluation, emotions, and behavioral reactions of those who belong to this specific group. Moreover, this kind of application of a stigma perspective may help to identify causes for the differences in integration outcomes of several groups of migrants in a certain country, or differences in integration of the same group of migrants (in terms of country of origin) in different countries of destination. To apply the conceptual mapping tool, one should use the most fine-grained definition of the migrant group, not only in terms of country of origin but also in terms of time of arrival.

In Table 2.2, we selected three levels of stigma (public or interpersonal, structural, and self-stigma as a form of intrapersonal stigma) from Table 2.1 and integrated them with three types of stigma experiences (enacted, anticipated, and avoided stigma, see Table 2.1 for definitions). We then hypothesized how each combination might affect people who are identified or self-identify as migrants. Notably, not only enacted, but also anticipated and avoided stigma can have detrimental effects on the life chances of migrants. Combined, all levels and types of stigma experiences result in diminished life chances, social exclusion, and adverse physical and mental health outcomes.

Conditions That May Result in Prejudice and/or Stigma or Neither

While there is something about movement (e.g., migration) that can lead to prejudice and/or stigma, it is critically important to understand the conditions under which prejudice and stigma occur to a greater or lesser extent. Below we highlight three possible outcomes that might result when a group migrates into a new context: (a) prejudice and stigma, (b) prejudice but no stigma, and (c) no prejudice and no stigma. Figure 2.1 illustrates how migration-generated diversity may or may not be met by instances of prejudice and/or stigma. We make the key distinction as stigma scholars have previously noted that for stigma to occur, unequal power between groups is essential (Link and Phelan 2001); however, prejudice may occur with or without a power differential.

Prejudice and Stigma

Migration-generated diversity may lead to differential outcomes when a migrant moves to a new context and experiences prejudice that ultimately results in stigmatization. A key aspect of this process is the nature of the power dynamics between migrants and citizens of the receiving country (see Blumer 1958).

Power is essential for successful stigmatization. Link and Phelan (2001) maintain that there needs to be a power gradient so that stigmatization can occur. People in groups with little power may label and form stereotypes of people with more power (Link and Phelan 2001). For instance, an individual who experiences homelessness may generate labels for the police that control them and link those labels to stereotypes of brutality, indifference, and rage. In addition, large segments of the public may generate labels and stereotypes about politicians and Wall Street bankers (Link and Phelan 2001). Does this make the police, politicians, and Wall Street bankers victims of stigma, relative to people experiencing homelessness or the general population, respectively?




Figure 2.1 An illustration of three pathways in which migration-generated diversity may or may not be met by instances of prejudice and/or stigma.

Answering yes to such a question would render stigma an overly broad concept, with little muscle for analytic purposes (Link and Phelan 2001).

To allow for more specific analytic utility around the framework of stigma, the concept of power must be considered (Link and Phelan 2001):

- Do people who might stigmatize have the power to ensure that the human difference they recognize and label is broadly identified in the culture?
- Do the people who might confer stigma have the power to ensure that the culture recognizes and deeply accepts the stereotypes they connect to the labeled differences?
- Do the people who might stigmatize have the power to separate “us” from “them” and make it stick?
- Do those who might stigmatize control access to major life domains (e.g., educational institutions, jobs, housing, and health care) have the ability to enforce the distinctions they draw?

If the answer is yes, we can expect stigma to result. If the answer is no, some of the cognitive components of stigma might be present but full-blown stigma would not exist.

Prejudice but Not Stigma

As previously mentioned, stigma occurs when there is a difference in power between groups (Link and Phelan 2001). From this perspective, prejudice may exist, but without the context of power there cannot be stigma. This has been demonstrated when a migrant group has power over the receiving society. For example, after Reunification in Germany, most leadership positions in the East were assumed by people born and trained in the West. This conscious decision was made for two reasons: First, leaders in the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) were suspected of having collaborated with the communist regime, and there was a consensus in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) that their power should not be perpetuated. Second, in almost all branches of society (e.g., education, economy, politics), governance followed the system that had been in place in the Federal Republic of Germany. People who had been trained in West Germany knew how to act within this system: how to achieve goals and enact an agenda. This knowledge was crucial to getting work done in the former East German areas. Thus, top leadership positions (e.g., professorships, CEO positions, political appointments) went almost exclusively to individuals from former West Germany. Effectively, this resulted in increased career opportunities for an entire generation of West Germans. At the same time, it crippled opportunities for potential leaders in the East. In addition, since World War II, individuals from West Germany had amassed far greater financial resources than their counterparts in communist

East Germany. Accordingly, companies and estates that went up for sale after Reunification were purchased primarily by individuals from the West.

These two conditions—knowledge of the system and financial resources—gave people who migrated from the West to the East an enormous advantage over their East German peers. This led to massive resentment with the receiving population. Labeled *Besserwessis*—a pejorative term derived from *Besserwisser* (know-it-all) and *Wessi* (West German)—these West German migrants were not subjected to overt discrimination, because their professional status gave them the power and opportunities to maneuver successfully within the system. Not surprisingly, people in the East soon detested the overconfident *Besserwessis*. This resentment would only be understood as stigma under conditions where the East Germans had more power (e.g., social acceptance); however, this was not the case and therefore did not amount to stigma.

Similar examples can be found in colonial activities; that is, when a minority group entered a country and exerted power over the receiving society. The labeling of the receiving country's citizens as “primitives” and subsequent application of racial stereotypes, the othering as well as the exploitation and domination mechanisms that were enacted demonstrate how a powerful minority can stigmatize a powerless majority, rather than vice versa. It also makes clear that stigma is more than negative attitudes toward a group.

Neither Prejudice nor Stigma

When migrants move into a new context and are welcomed by the receiving society, neither prejudice nor stigma may occur. An example of this is when a migrant possesses a skill or talent that fills an important void in the destination society (e.g., H-1B Visas in the United States, Mexican guest workers, White retirees to Mexico, Ukrainian refugees). In Europe, for instance, positive attitudes have been extended toward Ukrainian refugees from the ongoing war compared with much stricter attitudes toward Syrian refugees a decade ago. Underlying racial prejudice may play a role, as well as the age and gender composition of the refugee groups. In addition, there may be a higher level of familiarity and previous contact with Ukrainians. Most important to the acceptance of Ukraine refugees is the perception of a common enemy: Russia, which threatens not only Ukraine but residents of European countries as well.

Prejudice and stigma necessitate an “us” versus “them” distinction (Link and Phelan 2001). Thus, because Ukrainian refugees are perceived as “us” by Europeans, there is no prejudice or stigma in this case. Other examples include student migration or the migration of individuals in creative professions that rely on international mobility. An example of the latter is the migration of classical musicians from different parts of the world to Berlin to play in its many classical orchestras. Rarely do these migrants suffer from prejudice or stigma.

Additional Perspectives: A Consideration of Threat, Intersectionality, and What Matters Most

In our discussion, we selected three topics, some of which were included in our conceptual mapping tool, for further consideration: threat, intersectionality, and “what matters most.” Although these concepts/theories have not always been utilized in both fields, they are important in further highlighting phenomena that reside at the intersection of stigma and migration-generated diversity. This may also include a better understanding of differences in the “degree of stigmatization” that may occur under certain conditions (Link and Phelan 2001). These perspectives are also useful in illuminating more complex dynamics regarding evolving stigma processes to elucidate differing stigmatizing circumstances over time.

Threat

The concept of “threat” has been a central theoretical orientation in migration research, and much theorizing in sociology and social psychology points to feelings of threat as an important trigger of prejudicial attitudes (e.g., Blalock 1967; Sherif 1967; Stephan and Stephan 2000). Over the years, a wealth of empirical studies has lent support to these predictions (e.g., Bobo 1983; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006). One of the most prominent theories, which has been widely applied to explain anti-migrant attitudes, is group threat theory (Blumer 1958). This theory conceptualizes prejudice as a matter of intergroup relations that arise when members of the dominant group perceive a threat to their privileged position (Blumer 1958). In the original formulation of the theory, Blumer (1958) specifies four feelings always present in prejudicial attitudes and identifies threat as the key feeling. This implies that you may have a feeling that the other is inferior, fundamentally different and alien, and that you and your fellow group members, based on your group belonging, have the right to certain resources and privileges; however, critical to group threat theory is that if you do not have a perception that the other group threatens your position, it is not prejudice (Blumer 1958). Meanwhile, we argue that in line with how Allport’s (1954) conditions for intergroup contact to reduce prejudice have been reformulated as “facilitating” rather than “essential” (Pettigrew 1998), it may be useful to think about Blumer’s (1958) four feelings in a similar way. Further, while group threat theory originally emphasized group threats, empirical studies have demonstrated that threat may also operate on the individual level (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Scheepers et al. 2002). In other words, migrants can be perceived both as a threat to the individual (e.g., competition for work and earning a living) and as a threat toward the group that the individual identifies with, meaning that although the individual in question does not fear losing his or her job, migrants are considered a threat to the economic position of the group as a whole.

Dimensions of Threat

The threat literature further distinguishes between different dimensions or “types” of threat, the main dimensions being *economic, cultural, political, and security* threat (Blalock 1967; Hellwig and Sinno 2017; Scheepers et al. 2002). While threat may vary among different contexts and across time, anti-migrant attitudes seem to stem primarily from perceptions that migrants are undermining strongly held values, national symbols, or cultural traits (Sides and Citrin 2007). Such perceptions are often grouped under the label cultural or symbolic threat and are also discussed in terror management theory (Solomon et al. 1991), which is part of the stigma framework (Pachankis and Wang, this volume). In terror management theory, the need to defend cultural value systems from an outside threat is tied to human beings’ awareness of their own mortality, and to the key role of cultural systems in providing meaning and a promise of immortality (Greenberg et al. 1986). In addition to economic, cultural, political, and security threat, perceived threats may also be more un-specific and related to a general sense of unease or lack of control (Harell et al. 2017). The presence of migrants may disturb needs of predictability and control among the native-born population, which in turn may increase anxiety and general unease and therefore raise, for example, susceptibility to anti-migrant political rhetoric.

The different dimensions of threat can be useful to understand differences in the degree of prejudice faced by migrant groups (Hellwig and Sinno 2017), as well as attitudinal differences among the native-born population (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011). The dimensions may also be useful to understand prejudice between groups more equal in status; that is, groups that both are positioned in a subordinate position in relation to the dominant group. Many prejudice theories, including group threat theory, assume a dichotomous relationship (dominant–subordinate, majority–minority, native-born–immigrants), but reality is of course more complex. For example, the category “native-born” is far from homogeneous, in terms of race and ethnicity, and in terms of a family history of migration. Indeed, many born in the country, but with migrant parents or grandparents, are labeled as “migrants” or “immigrants” by the majority population. Thus, their level of prejudice is likely to diverge from that of the part of the native-born population that also belongs to the majority population. From empirical research we know that so-called second-generation immigrants and ethnic/racial minorities generally are more tolerant toward migrants (Sarrasin et al. 2018). One of the explanations for this is provided by cultural marginalization theory (Fetzer 2000), which suggests that those who were socialized as being disadvantaged or discriminated against develop solidarity and empathy toward other vulnerable groups. Still, prejudice between distinct minority groups, including between different groups labeled as “migrants,” exists. Acknowledging that the hierarchical relationship (and thus, who poses a threat to whom) between different groups may vary depending on such dimensions

may possibly be a way forward in understanding prejudice between different subordinate groups.

How “Threat” and “Stigma Functions” Can Be Conceptualized as Comparable

While the concept of threat primarily has been applied in the migration literature as a tool to explain variations in anti-migrant attitudes, we note that the three functions of stigma (see Table 2.1 for definitions) largely can be reformulated in terms of threat (Phelan et al. 2008). The function of exploitation and domination, to keep “them” down, can be reformulated as the others threatening “our” (e.g., the dominant group’s) privileges and resources; the function to uphold norms, to keep people in, as the others threatening “our” values and symbols; and the function of avoiding diseases, to keep people away, as the “others” (e.g., the migrant group) bring diseases and threaten “our” health and survival (Phelan et al. 2008). Taken together, this suggests that the concept of threat is present also in a stigma framework, although the concept per se is rarely used. The parallel to Blumer is also clear as he explicitly writes that the different feelings that constitute prejudice as a group position places the subordinate group below (feeling of superiority) and beyond (feeling of alienation) (Blumer 1958). The feeling of proprietary claim excludes them from resources and privileges, but the actual threat, according to Blumer (1958), is more of an emotional response, an emotional “recoil” or defensive reaction. It functions, he says, (although rarely long term) to preserve the integrity and position of the dominant group.

The overlap is clear, but there is also a difference in the emphasis on domination and exploitation in the stigma framework and the emphasis on threat in group threat theory. This difference implies a tension between the two literatures in how the threat perspective posits that prejudice is primarily grounded in a perceived discrepancy between how it should be but no longer is (or is about to become), while the dominance function in stigma implicates actual and retained power. Stigma, in this sense, is a way to exploit and dominate, whereas prejudice is primarily a reaction to (perceived) status loss. While our purpose here is not to solve this tension, we still note that it may be alleviated if the two (dominance vs. threat) are conceived of as operating on different levels. For example, studies in the threat literature show that often individuals in more precarious positions hold the most prejudiced attitudes, including in working class occupations or those with less education (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Velásquez and Eger 2022). This is generally explained by a greater perceived (and sometimes actual) individual threat on behalf of these individuals. Thus, although the function of “dominance and exploitation” may be the reason that prejudice exists (i.e., on a more basic level), threat may still be more useful to explain such in-group variations.

Thinking about the power dynamics of the stigma process together with group threat theory, a kind of paradox emerges: a stigmatized group of migrants is powerless in the first place. When the group gains access to resources, increases in numbers, or even in perceived power, the stigma process seems not to be lessened, but rather amplified. This is because the perceived threat that this group poses to the native-born population increases. So, the function of stigma, to reduce the threat posed by the migrant group to the native-born population's norms, security, and wealth and status, becomes more salient when the migrant group is perceived as more powerful and threatening, increasing the stigma of this group. This continues to be effective if there still is a power gradient—it is only when migrants become powerful, secure, settled, and influential enough, such that they cannot be devalued and discriminated against, that stigma stops.

Intersectionality

Intersectionality refers to the multiple interlocking systems of oppression that operate to disadvantage individuals whose social positions lie across multiple axes of marginalization. Emerging from Black American feminist scholarship (Collins and Bilge 2016; Combahee River Collective 1983; Crenshaw 1991; Hooks 1984), the construct of intersectionality has historically been applied to understanding the disadvantage experienced by Black women. When applied to legal contexts, an intersectional approach highlights how discrimination affecting Black women can remain unseen when analyzed only through the separate lens of either racism or gender bias. As a solution to such problems, an intersectional approach highlights the unique forms of discrimination directed toward Black women that are inseparable from either identity alone.

Given its solution to the problem of unseen interlocking forms of oppression toward other multiply stigmatized populations, intersectionality can theoretically expand understanding of stigma as it affects migrants who possess one or more additional marginalized statuses beyond their migrant status. Examples might include migrants who also possess a mental illness, migrants who are also LGBTQ, migrants who also possess a racialized identity, migrants with undocumented status, migrants with a minority religious identity, and migrants who are women. For these individuals, whose social positions incorporate at least one other stigmatized status in addition to being a migrant, their experience of stigma and migration is arguably distinct from those individuals who possess no other stigmatized status beyond their migrant position. For instance, from a structural level, possessing a mental illness might preclude migrants from certain opportunities (e.g., for employment, for health care, for citizenship status) that would not be denied to nonmigrants with the same mental illness. At a more personal level, a migrant's mental illness might be seen or interpreted (e.g., as more unpredictable, as more dangerous) by others as a function of their migrant status whereas this same mental illness would not be

interpreted in the same light when seen by others. In these cases, intersectional influences and experiences could be understood as being a function of the multiple stigmatizing structures that are directed toward each of the component statuses but in such a way that the impact of each form of structural stigma (e.g., toward migrants) is enhanced or at least made distinct in the context of the others (e.g., toward people with mental illness). An intersectionality lens could also be fruitfully used to understand experiences at the personal level, for instance when unique forms of oppression affecting multiply marginalized individuals muddies the ability of these individuals to easily attribute their experiences of discrimination to any one stigmatized characteristic.

Numerous aspects of the migrant experience could be considered through an intersectionality framework, including features of both the sending and the receiving context. Factors of the sending context that might influence the migrant experience in an intersectional manner include an individual's reasons for migrating—for instance, whether those reasons are voluntary or forced. Influential factors of receiving contexts might include whether one's reasons for migrating are deemed as deserving of protection in the receiving country. In this way, the experience of any one migrant might differ from the experience of another, at least in part because of the distinct intersections of these migration-related factors in addition to any other stigmatizing social status they might distinctly possess. At the same time, questions remain about whether other features of the migration experience can also be considered through an intersectional lens.

As both a theoretical and analytic tool, intersectionality poses opportunities and challenges for future research. Like with stigma concepts more generally, whether and how migration is racialized will inform whether race can be meaningfully analyzed in interaction with other aspects of migration-generated diversity to capture stigma not directed toward migration alone. For instance, does an intersectionality lens further aid in the explanation of the distinct forms of treatment experienced by Ukrainian versus Syrian refugees to Europe not explained through simply migration stigma or racism alone? Similarly, can the distinct stigma experience of Ukrainian residents not born in Ukraine—for example, students from African countries studying in Ukraine—offer another opportunity for intersectional analysis? Although intersectionality might be most frequently considered through the lens of binary, or at least group-based, categories (e.g., Black vs. White X man vs. woman), this approach might not best capture reality, for instance, in the case of race analyzed along a continuum of skin color or gender analyzed as a continuous function of masculinity and femininity. Finally, multiplicative interaction terms capturing an individual's multiple social positions represent one approach to studying intersectional influences. At the same time, analytic approaches to intersectionality should not lose sight of the original impetus and value of an intersectionality framework in being able to capture the existence and influences of the structurally stigmatizing forces directed toward those whose identities lie at the statistical

intersection. That is, ideal future analytic approaches will stay true to intersectionality theory by not only parsing stigmatized individuals into discrete units of analysis but also bringing to light the stigmatizing structures that make this necessary in the first place.

What Matters Most

Another observable dynamic that could elucidate a more complex understanding of migration-related stigma processes within migrant groups are the “core everyday engagements,” or “what matters most” (below), within migrant groups. Systematically assessing these daily lived experiences could aid in capturing stigma processes related to dearly held, everyday cultural practices, in addition to assessing other (mostly) observable statuses related to migration (e.g., race, ethnicity, religion). Simultaneously, these, and oftentimes distinct, core everyday activities are being lived out by local community groups (including those most proximal to the migrant group) in the receiving society as well as across the broader receiving society itself. As described below, these core daily activities that are lived out in everyday interactions may overlap, diverge, or come into conflict with one another, and may transform as the groups interact and exert influence upon one another over time (below), with implications for migration stigma. This perspective, by understanding, and operationalizing “matches” and “mismatches” between the daily cultural activities that “matter most” between migrant and receiving groups (below), can expand upon more traditional measures of structural or economic integration (see Okamoto and Adem, this volume) by assessing key “cultural components” of integration.

What is “most valued” by a local community can be defined, and observed as “the felt flow of engagements in a local world” (Kleinman 1999:358). In the context of migration, a local world refers to a somewhat circumscribed domain within which the everyday life activities of the migrant group take place (also, other, parallel local worlds exist within local communities in the receiving society). A local world is most observable in a tightly knit social network or neighborhood/community by which migrants arrive to the receiving society where members of the local world share social connections (i.e., may know, or know of, one another or one’s families or neighbors, or share a common locale); however, for migrants who come from large urban areas and who are not socially connected, the concept of the local world may not be as applicable. What defines all local worlds, including the one in which migrants and those from the local receiving groups reside in, is the fact that something is deeply at stake (Kleinman 1999). Daily life matters and is upheld via everyday lived participation by actors within local worlds. If local group members find that what is held to be “most at stake” may be seriously menaced or even entirely lost, these threats may lead them to respond to the perceived threat by discriminating against and marginalizing others (Yang et al. 2007). Deepening the above understandings of threat-based processes that migrants are seen to

threaten strongly held values, national symbols, or cultural traits, people with local worlds have something observable to gain or lose, such as: status, money, life chances, health, good fortune, a job, or relationships. This feature of daily life, called “moral experience” by Kleinman (1999), refers to that register of everyday life that defines “what matters most” or “what is most at stake” for ordinary men and women (Kleinman 1999, 2006; Kleinman et al. 1997). What is key is that “what matters most” is observable, and discoverable, typically through robust ethnographic and qualitative methods.

Participation in what matters most demarcates individuals as full participants in social life or delegitimizes others as not quite integrated. For example, among a sample of primarily undocumented Chinese immigrants with psychosis from Fujian Province, China, perpetuating the lineage (and engaging in employment as a strategy to achieve this) reflected actualization of “what matters most” (or “personhood”) in this cultural group (Yang et al. 2014). That is, if a Chinese immigrant with psychosis was able to consistently work and to accrue sufficient material resources to attract a spouse and have children, they were seen as a full-fledged “person” within their local world. Everyday lived activities centered around perpetuating one’s immortal lineage are seen to reflect what is “most at stake” across many Chinese communities and was discovered as being continuously enacted within this particular immigrant group via qualitative methods (i.e., semi-structured qualitative interviews); in a similar fashion, qualitative methods can be used to identify what is most valued within particular migrant groups and comparing and contrasting this to what is “most valued” by local receiving communities.

Implications of adopting this framework for migration research include the following. First, recognition of fulfilling the cultural roles that affirm personhood within the local migrant group could act to buffer prejudice, stigma, or discrimination enacted by the larger receiving society. To build upon the prior example, if an undocumented Chinese immigrant with psychosis engaged in the activities of being a “respected person” by fulfilling obligations to lineage (i.e., by working and accruing material resources) and is recognized as such by their local world, this could act to buffer against prejudice, stigma, or discrimination from the receiving society. Conceptions of “personhood” can further extend to social networks in sending contexts. For example, for Chinese immigrants, lineage obligations also extend to sending remittances to family members from the sending country; the amount of these remittances are recognized (and publicly recorded) by the migrant’s social network in the sending country, thus enhancing the family’s status (and that of the contributing migrant within their local network). The “what matters most” framework enables discovery of the capabilities that are core to personhood for migrant groups (Yang et al. 2014); enactment of these core cultural capabilities could be an important source of self-esteem, continued integration into the local migrant world, and other positive psychosocial outcomes, and could potentially buffer from prejudicial or stigmatizing experiences from the receiving society.

Second, the “what matters most” framework could be used to examine core everyday activities that are lived out in daily interactions that may overlap, diverge, or come into conflict with one another as the migrant group contacts local receiving groups, and may transform as the groups interact. For migrant groups that are encouraged to integrate to the receiving society’s dominant norms and values, loss of “what matters most” to the migrant group and adoption of core lived values of the receiving society can be both a threat and an opportunity. For example, as migrant group members begin to adopt the lived engagements that “matter most” to receiving group members, this may be perceived as greatly threatening by members of the migrant network (e.g., older family members, who may be invested in preserving the activities and traditions that “matter most” to them). On the other hand, this route may lead to increased opportunities via adaptation to the receiving society (e.g., increased opportunities via education and work opportunities; although this strategy may have limits—see the “integration paradox,” Okamoto and Adem, this volume). Alternatively, if migrant group members choose to preserve their participation in the core lived values of the migrant social group, this could preserve “personhood” within their social networks (per above) but may also lead to corresponding loss of higher status educational and vocational opportunities in the receiving society. Further, highly visible markers of continued participation in “what matters most” to the migrant local world, especially if seen to be foreign or alien to receiving society members, may also be perceived as a significant source of societal threat (below).

Identifying and classifying “what matters most” within the migrant and receiving group local worlds, and potential “mismatch” between these, could be empirically evaluated for their significance in migration processes (e.g., perceived threat by the receiving group). That is, rather than assessing whether a migrant group poses a threat to the receiving society’s “national identity” as broadly constructed, identifying the specific core lived values in the receiving group (e.g., human rights, including gender equality), and how those of the migrant group could threaten these values (e.g., ostensibly patriarchal values leading to visible subordination of women), could be empirically evaluated. Questions could then be identified and evaluated after operationalizing to what extent the activities that “matter most” converge, overlap, and/or conflict between the two groups. For example, would receiving groups be more likely to stigmatize and feel strongly threatened by migrant groups whose core lived activities directly conflict with that of the receiving community? For example, if a migrant group’s conceptions of what it means to be a “respected woman” in their community meant holding a (visibly) subordinate role that conflicted with a receiving society’s norms of gender equality, would this be perceived as more threatening by the receiving group? An initial hypothesis is that a greater (visible) degree of mismatch would be associated with greater endorsed threat by the receiving group. Alternatively, circumstances could exist whereby opportunities for the migrant group to directly participate in “what matters most”

for receiving society groups could mitigate migration stigma. For example, migrants who can immediately participate in economic activities to bolster withering local economies may earn acceptance as being part of the receiving community (see Okamoto and Adem, this volume). This leads to a broader question: If migrant groups over time and the course of integration are able to participate in daily lived activities that “matter most” to receiving groups, might this lead to fuller acceptance and integration with receiving societies? Further exploration of whether a migrant group participates in the receiving groups’ daily lived activities, and in what spheres of life (e.g., economic, social, religious), and whether this could lead to reduced migrant stigma, could yield additional insights.

Two further key considerations are noted. First, actual mismatch between “what matters most” between the migrant and the receiving group may not be most salient in determining endorsed threat; instead, the mismatch elicited by what is *perceived* by receiving group members as “mattering most” to migrant group members may be most influential. Second, “what matters most” for the receiving society should be considered at distinct levels: (a) per above, at the group level for the most proximal local receiving group, as cultural matches and conflicts between groups may be experienced in daily intergroup interactions; (b) “what matters most” (e.g., what is promoted in terms of protected rights and privileges, such as gender equality, and who is eligible for these) as represented at the macro policy/institutional levels. Nonetheless, bringing in the “lived experience” of daily cultural activities in the ways outlined above can enhance our understanding of migration stigma.

Conclusion

To conclude, we distill down what this chapter aimed to contribute to this emerging field (i.e., what we know) in addition to what we have identified as key future directions for the emerging intersection of migration and stigma (i.e., migration-related stigma).

What Do We Know about Migration-Generated Diversity?

How migration and stigma scholars might conceptualize the processes that may follow migration-generated diversity (e.g., negative attitudes and emotional reactions, occurrences of exclusion, and discrimination or “overall stigma”) have been written about differently in the migration and stigma fields, yet these fields have much to offer one another. There are many concepts, theories, and frameworks utilized in these fields that could aid in future research at the intersection of migration-related stigma. Therefore, to better inform each field of relevant and important concepts to be used by researchers, we created a conceptual mapping tool (and an example of how to utilize this conceptual

mapping tool) which we hope is useful for scholars at this intersection in their formulation of new research agendas.

We further discussed the core aspect of movement inherent in migration and its relation to prejudice and stigma. While we believe that movement is an essential core of migration-generated stigma, we also recognize that it is not the only piece and other statuses, such as one's race/ethnicity, may matter above and beyond this. Further, the intersection of multiple disadvantaged statuses may explain more differences in the "strength" (or the degree) of migration-related stigma that groups may experience (Link and Phelan 2001). To reiterate an important claim, all migrants are outsiders but the strength (including the absence of) stigma often varies. Other key concepts such as group threat theory (Blumer 1958) and "what matters most" (Yang et al. 2014) may further elucidate functions of stigma and/or threat leading to more refined understandings of why people stigmatize and relatedly why people are stigmatized, further leading to creation and/or refinement of stigma-reduction methods related to migration stigma. Further, we concluded that prejudice can take place without stigma necessarily occurring—specifically that for occurrences of stigma to truly happen there must be a power differential (Link and Phelan 2001). In the absence of this, migrants may (or may not) experience prejudice but cannot experience stigma.

What are key future directions for these now intersecting fields? Numerous questions remain unanswered and will be important for future scholars to consider. To begin, let us consider the following areas:

1. Although we have defined key concepts, theories, and frameworks from both the migration and stigma fields in this chapter (see Table 2.1), further refinement may be necessary, especially for key concepts, theories, and frameworks which remain under- or undefined in the context of migration-generated stigma.
2. We have discussed some examples of measures that may aid researchers in developing new research agendas in the field of migration-related stigma, but also recognize that to date most of these measures lie in the stigma area and that it may be methodologically difficult to implement these concepts, theories, and frameworks in new studies that are seeking to understand migration-generated diversity and whether and to what degree this is met by prejudice and/or stigma. In relation to new studies on migration-generated stigma, greater specificity in how best to define, utilize, and measure these relevant concepts, theories, and frameworks will allow for the creation of better informed and tailored interventions aimed at reducing prejudice and/or stigma due to migration-generated diversity.

Conceptions

Future research should seek to construct better models designed to analyze and more deeply understand under what conditions migration-related stigma is strongest when conceptualizing stigma as gradient or a “matter of degree” (Link and Phelan 2001). Key to reduction of migration-related stigma is to conceptualize what moderates the strength of stigma including how to think about what constructs are most useful in this endeavor. Some specific constructs/theories to further consider and elucidate include “what matters most” (also in relation to the stigmatizer), the intersection of race/migration, documented/undocumented status, and “deservingness” of the migrant group.

Measurement

Overall, researchers should think about how we can further operationalize concepts so that they better translate to both (and at the intersection of) the migration and stigma literatures. One specific way in which this might be accomplished is to think about how stigma scholars can better integrate Blumer’s (1958) group threat theory into their stigma research (more broadly and specifically in relation to migration-generated diversity). Additionally, scholars should seek to better construct, or if necessary, reexamine how our existing methods of measuring the relationships between migration-generated diversity and stigma can be better conceptualized to incorporate key theories and concepts such as “what matters most” and intersectionality that might be especially relevant in the context of migration and conceptualizing changes in migration stigma over time. Finally, it is important to address how we can incorporate these into current measurements that look at the perspective of the stigmatizer. For instance, can the core theories that we elucidated in this chapter be applied in the context of examining the stigmatizer?

Stigma-Reduction Interventions

Better elucidating the concepts from the migration and stigma fields, the potential relationships between them, and how best to measure them is crucial to inform more effective stigma-reduction methods when migration-related diversity is met by prejudice, stigma, and/or discrimination. Some of the questions that future research may wish to explore further include:

- How does the intersection of these concepts from the migration and stigma fields better inform interventions to reduce prejudice, stigma, and discrimination prompted by migration-generated diversity?
- What do experiences of threat and prejudice do for the stigmatizer, and how are such insights useful in developing strategies to alleviate threat and reduce prejudice/stigma?

- Are there other ways to alleviate threat, such as by addressing perceived vulnerability or realistically apprising potential threats that migrant groups pose to achieving “what matters most” in receiving groups?

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