

Bibliography

- Acerbi, A., and A. Mesoudi. 2015. If We Are All Cultural Darwinians What's the Fuss About? Clarifying Recent Disagreements in the Field of Cultural Evolution. *Biol. Philos.* **30**:481–503. [3]
- Afshar, M., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2014. A Unified Modelling Approach for Producer-Scrounger Games in Complex Ecological Conditions. *Anim. Behav.* **96**:167–176. [3]
- Afshar, M., C. L. Hall, and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2015. Zebra Finches Scrounge More When Patches Vary in Quality: Experimental Support of the Linear Operator Learning Rule. *Anim. Behav.* **105**:181–186. [3]
- Agosta, S. J., N. Janz, and D. R. Brooks. 2010. How Specialists Can Be Generalists: Resolving the “Parasite Paradox” and Implications for Emerging Infectious Disease. *Zoologia* **27**:151–162. [3]
- Agrawal, A. 2001. Common Property Institutions and the Sustainable Governance of Resources. *World Dev.* **29**:1649–1672. [5]
- Agrawal, A., and A. Chhatre. 2006. Explaining Success on the Commons: Community Forest Governance in the Indian Himalayas. *World Dev.* **34**:149–166. [5]
- Agrawal, A., A. Chhatre, and R. Hardin. 2008. Changing Governance of the World's Forests. *Science* **320**:1460–1462. [5]
- Agrawal, A., and S. Goyal. 2001. Group Size and Collective Action: Third-Party Monitoring in Common-Pool Resources. *Comp. Polit. Stud.* **34**:63–93. [5]
- Agrawal, A., and E. Ostrom. 2001. Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal. *Polit. Soc.* **29**:485–514. [5]
- Agrawal, A., and G. Yadama. 1997. How Do Local Institutions Mediate Market and Population Pressures on Resources? Forest Panchayats in Kumaon, India. *Dev. Change* **28**:435–465. [5]
- Akerlof, G. A., and R. E. Kranton. 2005. Identity and the Economics of Organizations. *J. Econ. Perspect.* **19**:9–32. [10]
- Alger, I. and J. W. Weibull. 2013. Homo Moralis: Preference Evolution under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching. *Econometrica* **81**:2269–2302. [2]
- Allen, B., and M. A. Nowak. 2015. Games among Relatives Revisited. *J. Theor. Biol.* **378**:103–116. [3]
- Allen, R. C., L. McNally, R. Popat, and S. P. Brown. 2016. Quorum Sensing Protects Bacterial Cooperation from Exploitation by Cheats. *ISME J.* **10**:1706–1716. [7, 10]
- Allen, R. C., R. Popat, S. P. Diggle, and S. P. Brown. 2014. Targeting Virulence: Can We Make Evolution-Proof Drugs? *Nat. Rev. Microbiol.* **12**:300–308. [7]
- Allingham, M. 2002. Choice Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. [3]
- Allport, G. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. [2]
- Alzua, M. L., J. C. Cardenas, and H. Djebbari. 2014. Community Mobilization around Social Dilemmas: Evidence from Lab Experiments in Rural Mali. *CEDLAS Working Papers* **160**:1–34. [6]
- Ambrus, A., and B. Greiner. 2012. Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **102**:3317–3332. [10]

- Ambrus, A., B. Greiner, and P. Pathak. 2015. How Individual Preferences Are Aggregated in Groups: An Experimental Study. *J. Public Econ.* **129**:1–13. [10]
- Andam, K. S., P. J. Ferraro, K. R. E. Sims, A. Healy, and M. B. Holland. 2010. Protected Areas Reduced Poverty in Costa Rica and Thailand. *PNAS* **107**:9996–10001. [5]
- Andersson, M. 1985. Brood Parasites within Species. In: Producers and Scroungers, ed. C. J. Barnard, pp. 195–228. New York: Chapman & Hall. [11]
- Andersson, M., and J. Krebs. 1978. Evolution of Hoarding Behavior. *Anim. Behav.* **26**:707–711. [12]
- Andreoni, J. 1995. Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **85**:891–904. [2, 3]
- Andreoni, J., and J. H. Miller. 1993. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma: Experimental Evidence. *Econ. J.* **103**:570–585. [2, 3]
- Aoki, K., L. Lehmann, and M. W. Feldman. 2011. Rates of Cultural Change and Patterns of Cultural Accumulation in Stochastic Models of Social Transmission. *Theor. Popul. Biol.* **79**:192–202. [3]
- Arbilly, M. 2015. Understanding the Evolution of Learning by Explicitly Modeling Learning Mechanisms. *Curr. Zool.* **61**:341–349. [3]
- Arbilly, M., U. Motro, M. W. Feldman, and A. Lotem. 2010. Co-Evolution of Learning Complexity and Social Foraging Strategies. *J. Theor. Biol.* **267**:573–581. [3]
- Arbilly, M., D. B. Weissman, M. W. Feldman, and U. Grodzinski. 2014. An Arms Race between Producers and Scroungers Can Drive the Evolution of Social Cognition. *Behav. Ecol.* **25**:487–495. [3]
- Archetti, M., and I. Scheuring. 2011. Coexistence of Cooperation and Defection in Public Goods Games. *Evolution* **65**:1140–1148. [3]
- . 2012. Review: Game Theory of Public Goods in One-Shot Social Dilemmas without Assortment. *J. Theor. Biol.* **299**:9–20. [6]
- Aumann, R. J. 1995. Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality. *Games Econ. Behav.* **8**:6–19. [3]
- Aureli, F., and C. P. Vanschaik. 1991. Post-Conflict Behavior in Long-Tailed Macaques (*Macaca fascicularis*): Coping with the Uncertainty. *Ethology* **89**:101–114. [12]
- Avitabile, A., M. Herold, G. B. M. Heuvelink, et al. 2016. An Integrated Pan-Tropical Biomass Map Using Multiple Reference Datasets. *Global Change Biol.* **22**:1406–1420. [5]
- Axelrod, R. 2000. On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory. *Analyse & Kritik* **22**:130–151. [3]
- Axelrod, R., and W. D. Hamilton. 1981. The Evolution of Cooperation. *Science* **211**:1390–1396. [3, 6]
- Baland, J. M., P. Bardhan, and S. Bowles, eds. 2006. Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. [6]
- Balooni, K., M. Inoue, and V. Ballabh. 2007. Declining Instituted Collective Management Practices and Forest Quality in the Central Himalayas. *Econ. Polit. Wkly.* **42**:1443–1452. [5]
- Baquero, F., and J. Campos. 2003. The Tragedy of the Commons in Antimicrobial Chemotherapy. *Rev. Esp. Quimioter.* **16**:11–13. [9]
- Bardhan, P., and D. Mookherjee. 2002. Relative Capture of Local and Central Governments: An Essay in the Political Economy of Decentralization. Secondary Relative Capture of Local and Central Governments: An Essay in the Political Economy of Decentralization. <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/9gx7t5hd>. (accessed Aug. 18, 2016). [6]

- Barnard, C. J., ed. 1984. *Producers and Scroungers: Strategies of Exploitation and Parasitism*. London: Croom Helm. [3]
- Barnard, C. J., and J. M. Behnke, eds. 1990. *Parasitism and Host Behaviour*. London: Taylor & Francis. [3]
- Barnard, C. J., and R. M. Sibly. 1981. Producers and Scroungers: A General-Model and Its Application to Captive Flocks of House Sparrows. *Anim. Behav.* **29**:543–550. [3, 6, 11, 12]
- Barrette, M., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2006. Prey Crypticity Reduces the Proportion of Group Members Searching for Food. *Anim. Behav.* **71**:1183–1189. [11]
- Barta, Z., R. Flynn, and L.-A. Giraldeau. 1997. Geometry for a Selfish Foraging Group: A Genetic Algorithm Approach. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **264**:1233–1238. [3, 11]
- Barta, Z., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 1998. The Effect of Dominance Hierarchy on the Use of Alternative Foraging Tactics: A Phenotype-Limited Producing-Scrounging Game. *Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.* **42**:217–223. [4, 12]
- . 2000. Daily Patterns of Optimal Producer and Scrounger Use under Predation Hazard: A State-Dependent Dynamic Game Analysis. *Am. Nat.* **155**:570–582. [3, 4]
- . 2001. Breeding Colonies as Information Centres: A Re-Appraisal of Information-Based Hypotheses Using the Producer-Scrounger Game. *Behav. Ecol.* **12**:121–127. [3, 4]
- Baselski, V. S., R. A. Medina, and C. D. Parker. 1978. Survival and Multiplication of *Vibrio cholerae* in the Upper Bowel of Infant Mice. *Infect. Immun.* **22**:435–440. [9]
- . 1979. *In Vivo* and *in Vitro* Characterization of Virulence-Deficient Mutants of *Vibrio cholerae*. *Infect. Immun.* **24**:111–116. [9]
- Basurto, X., E. Blanco, M. Nenadovic, and B. Vollan. 2016. Integrating Simultaneous Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior into Theories of Collective Action. *Science Advances* **2**:e1501220. [3]
- Batisse, M. 1997. Biosphere Reserves: A Challenge for Biodiversity Conservation and Regional Development. *Environment* **39**:6–13. [5]
- Bauch, C. T., and D. J. D. Earn. 2004. Vaccination and the Theory of Games. *PNAS* **101**:13391–13394. [9]
- Baylis, K., J. Honey-Rosés, J. Börner, et al. 2016. Mainstreaming Impact Evaluation in Nature Conservation. *Conserv. Lett.* **9**:58–64. [5]
- Baynes, J., J. Herbohn, C. Smith, R. Fisher, and D. Bray. 2015. Key Factors Which Influence the Success of Community Forestry in Developing Countries. *Global Environ. Change* **35**:226–238. [5]
- Beauchamp, G. 2000. Learning Rules for Social Foragers: Implications for the Producer-Scrounger Game and Ideal Free Distribution Theory. *J. Theor. Biol.* **207**:21–35. [3]
- . 2008. A Spatial Model of Producing and Scrounging. *Anim. Behav.* **76**:1935–1942. [3]
- Becker, D., M. Selbach, C. Rollenhagen, et al. 2006. Robust Salmonella Metabolism Limits Possibilities for New Microbials. *Nature* **440**:303–307. [8]
- Becker, G. 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. *J. Polit. Econ.* **76**:169–217. [2]
- Belmaker, A., U. Motro, M. W. Feldman, and A. Lotem. 2012. Learning to Choose among Social Foraging Strategies in Adult House Sparrows (*Passer domesticus*). *Ethology* **118**:1111–1121. [3]

- Belshaw, C. S. 1965. The Cultural Milieu of the Entrepreneur. In: Explorations in Enterprise, ed. H. G. Aitken, pp. 139–162. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. [3]
- Bénabou, R., and J. Tirole. 2006. Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **96**:1652–1677. [2]
- Berglund, A., A. Bisazza, and A. Pilastro. 1996. Armaments and Ornaments: An Evolutionary Explanation of Traits of Dual Utility. *Biol. J. Linn. Soc.* **58**:385–399. [12]
- Bergmüller, R., and M. Taborsky. 2010. Animal Personality Due to Social Niche Specialisation. *Trends Ecol. Evol.* **25**:504–511. [11]
- Bergstrom, C. T., and P. Godfrey-Smith. 1998. On the Evolution of Behavioral Heterogeneity in Individuals and Populations. *Biol. Philos.* **13**:205–231. [11]
- Bester, H., and W. Gueth. 1998. Is Altruism Evolutionarily Stable? *J. Econ. Behav. Organ.* **34**:193–209. [2]
- Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch. 1998. Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity Fads and Informational Cascades. *J. Econ. Perspect.* **12**:151–170. [11]
- Binmore, K. 1996. A Note on Backward Induction. *Games Econ. Behav.* **17**:135–137. [3]
- Binmore, K., J. McCarthy, G. Ponti, L. Samuelson, and A. Shaked. 2002. A Backward Induction Experiment. *J. Econ. Theory* **104**:48–88. [3]
- Bisin, A., G. Topa, and T. Verdier. 2004. Cooperation as a Transmitted Cultural Trait. *Ration. Soc.* **16**:477–507. [2]
- Blanco, M., D. Engelmann, and H. T. Normann. 2011. A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences. *Games Econ. Behav.* **72**:321–338. [2]
- Bloch, M. 1973. The Long Term and the Short Term: The Economic and Political Significance of the Morality of Kinship. In: The Character of Kinship, ed. J. Goody, pp. 75–87. London: Cambridge Univ. Press. [3]
- Bohnet, I., B. Frey, and S. Huck. 2001. More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* **95**:131–144. [2]
- Bolton, G., B. Greiner, and A. Ockenfels. 2013. Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information. *Manag. Sci.* **59**:265–285. [10]
- . 2015. Conflict Resolution vs. Conflict Escalation in Online Markets. Secondary Conflict Resolution vs. Conflict Escalation in Online Markets. <http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2015-19.pdf>. (accessed Aug. 25, 2016). [10]
- Bolton, G. E., E. Katok, and A. Ockenfels. 2004. How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation. *Manag. Sci.* **50**:1587–1602. [2]
- Bolton, G. E., and A. Ockenfels. 2000. ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **90**:166–193. [3, 12]
- Bonhoeffer, S., M. Lipsitch, and B. R. Levin. 1997. Evaluating Treatment Protocols to Prevent Antibiotic Resistance. *PNAS* **94**:12106–12111. [8, 9]
- Börgers, T., and R. Sarin. 1997. Learning through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics. *J. Econ. Theory* **77**:1–14. [2, 3]
- Börner, J., and S. Vosti. 2013. Managing Tropical Forest Ecosystem Services: An Overview of Options. In: Governing the Provision of Ecosystem Services, ed. R. Muradian and L. Rival, pp. 21–46. Dordrecht: Springer. [6]
- Bowler, D. E., L. M. Buyung-Ali, J. R. Healy, et al. 2012. Does Community Forest Management Provide Global Environmental Benefits and Improve Local Welfare? *Front. Ecol. Environ.* **10**:29–36. [5]

- Bowles, S. 1998. Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions. *J. Econ. Lit.* **36**:75–111. [2]
- Bowles, S., and S. H. Hwang. 2008. Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism Design When Social Preferences Depend on Incentives. *J. Public Econ.* **92**:1811–1820. [3]
- Bowles, S., and S. Polania-Reyes. 2012. Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements? *J. Econ. Lit.* **50**:368–425. [2, 6]
- Boyd, R., and P. J. Richerson. 1995. Why Does Culture Increase Human Adaptability. *Ethol. Sociobiol.* **16**:125–143. [3]
- . 2005. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Evolution and Cognition, S. Stich, series ed. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. [2]
- Branas-Garza, P., R. Cobo-Reyes, M. P. Espinosa, et al. 2010. Altruism and Social Integration. *Games Econ. Behav.* **69**:249–257. [2]
- Bray, D. B., L. Merino-Pérez, P. Negreros-Castillo, et al. 2003. Mexico’s Community-Managed Forests as a Global Model for Sustainable Landscapes. *Conserv. Biol.* **17**:672–677. [5]
- Brown, S. P., D. M. Cornforth, and N. Mideo. 2012. Evolution of Virulence in Opportunistic Pathogens: Generalism, Plasticity, and Control. *Trends Microbiol.* **20**:336–342. [7, 9]
- Brown, S. P., R. F. Inglis, and F. Taddei. 2009a. Evolutionary Ecology of Microbial Wars: Within-Host Competition and (Incidental) Virulence. *Evol. Appl.* **2**:32–39. [4, 7]
- Brown, S. P., and P. D. Taylor. 2010. Joint Evolution of Multiple Social Traits: A Kin Selection Analysis. *Proc. Roy. Soc. B* **277**:415–427. [7]
- Brown, S. P., S. A. West, S. P. Diggle, and A. S. Griffin. 2009b. Social Evolution in Micro-Organisms and a Trojan Horse Approach to Medical Intervention Strategies. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* **364**:3157–3168. [7]
- Bshary, A., and R. Bshary. 2010. Self-Serving Punishment of a Common Enemy Creates a Public Good in Reef Fishes. *Curr. Biol.* **20**:2032–2035. [6]
- Buchanan, J. M. 1975. The Samaritan’s Dilemma. In: Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory, ed. E. S. Phelps, pp. 71–85. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. [3]
- Buckling, A., and M. A. Brockhurst. 2008. Kin Selection and the Evolution of Virulence. *Heredity* **100**:484–488. [9]
- Bugnyar, T., and B. Heinrich. 2005. Ravens, *Corvus corax*, Differentiate between Knowledgeable and Ignorant Competitors. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **272**:1641–1646. [11]
- . 2006. Pilfering Ravens, *Corvus corax*, Adjust Their Behaviour to Social Context and Identity of Competitors. *Anim. Cogn.* **9**:369–376. [11]
- Bugnyar, T., and K. Kotschal. 2002. Observational Learning and the Raiding of Food Caches in Ravens, *Corvus corax*: Is It “Tactical” Deception? *Anim. Behav.* **64**:185–195. [11]
- Camerer, C. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. [2]
- Camerer, C., and T. H. Ho. 1999. Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games. *Econometrica* **67**:827–874. [3]
- Caraco, T., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 1991. Social Foraging: Producing and Scrounging in a Stochastic Environment. *J. Theor. Biol.* **153**:559–583. [3, 11]
- Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., and M. Feldman. 1981. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. [2]

- Chadwick, D. J., and J. Goode, eds. 1997. Antibiotic Resistance: Origins, Evolution, Selection, and Spread. CIBA Foundation Symposium 207. New York: Wiley. [9]
- Charness, G., R. Cobo-Reyes, and N. Jimenez. 2014. Identities, Selection, and Contributions in a Public-Goods Game. *Games Econ. Behav.* **87**:322–338. [12]
- Charness, G., and M. Duwfenberg. 2006. Promises and Partnerships. *Econometrica* **74**:1579–1601. [2]
- Charness, G., and M. Rabin. 2002. Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests. *Q. J. Econ.* **117**:817–869. [3, 4]
- Chaudhuri, A. 2011. Sustaining Cooperation in Laboratory Public Goods Experiments: A Selective Survey of the Literature. *Exp. Econ.* **14**:47–83. [3, 10]
- Cheung, Y. W., and D. Friedman. 1997. Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results. *Games Econ. Behav.* **19**:46–76. [3]
- Chhatre, A., and A. Agrawal. 2008. Forest Commons and Local Enforcement. *PNAS* **105**:13286–13291. [5]
- Chichilnisky, G. 1996. An Axiomatic Approach to Sustainable Development. *Soc. Choice Welfare* **13**:231–257. [9]
- Choffnes, E. R., D. A. Relman, and A. Mack. 2010. Antibiotic Resistance: Implications for Global Health and Novel Intervention Strategies: Workshop Summary. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press. [9]
- Christakis, N., and J. Fowler. 2008. The Collective Dynamics of Smoking in a Large Social Network. *New Engl. J. Med.* **358**:2249–2259. [2]
- Christian, C., D. Ainley, M. Bailey, et al. 2013. A Review of Formal Objections to Marine Stewardship Council Fisheries Certifications. *Biol. Conserv.* **161**:10–17. [6]
- Clark, C. W. 1990. *Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources* (2nd edition). New York: Wiley. [6]
- Clark, C. W., and M. Mangel. 1986. The Evolutionary Advantages of Group Foraging. *Theor. Popul. Biol.* **3**:45–75. [6]
- Clatworthy, A. E., E. Pierson, and D. T. Hung. 2007. Targeting Virulence: A New Paradigm for Antimicrobial Therapy. *Nat. Chem. Biol.* **3**:541–548. [7]
- Clayton, N. C., D. P. Griffiths, N. D. Emery, and A. Dickinson. 2001. Elements of Episodic-Like Memory in Animals. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* **356**:1483–1491. [11]
- Clutton-Brock, T. H., and G. A. Parker. 1995. Punishment in Animal Societies. *Nature* **373**:209–216. [12]
- Coates, A. R. M., G. Halls, and Y. Hu. 2011. Novel Classes of Antibiotics or More of the Same? *Br. J. Pharmacol.* **163**:184–194. [8]
- Congleton, R. D., A. L. Hillman, and K. A. Konrad. 2008. 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking: Theory of Rent Seeking. Berlin: Springer. [3]
- Coolen, I. 2002. Increasing Foraging Group Size Increases Scrounger Use and Reduces Searching Efficiency in Nutmeg Mannikins (*Lonchura punctulata*). *Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.* **52**:232–238. [3, 11]
- Coolen, I., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2003. Incompatibility between Anti-Predatory Vigilance and Scrounger Tactic in Nutmeg Mannikins (*Lonchura punctulata*). *Anim. Behav.* **66**:657–664. [4]
- Coolen, I., L.-A. Giraldeau, and M. Lavoie. 2001. Head Position as an Indicator of Producer and Scrounger Tactics in a Ground Feeding Bird. *Anim. Behav.* **61**:895–903. [3, 4, 11]
- Coolen, I., L.-A. Giraldeau, and W. L. Vickery. 2007. Scrounging Behavior Regulates Population Dynamics. *Oikos* **116**:533–539. [4, 11]

- Coolen, I., A. J. W. Ward, P. J. B. Hart, and K. N. Laland. 2005. Foraging Nine-Spined Sticklebacks Prefer to Rely on Public Information over Simpler Social Cues. *Behav. Ecol.* **16**:865–870. [11]
- Cote, I. M., and R. Poulin. 1995. Parasitism and Group-Size in Social Animals: A Metaanalysis. *Behav. Ecol.* **6**:159–165. [12]
- Courvalin, P. 2010. Antibiotic-Induced Resistance Flow. In: Antibiotic Resistance: Implications for Global Health and Novel Intervention Strategies: Workshop Summary, ed. E. R. Choffnes et al., pp. 141–149. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press. [9]
- Cox, M., G. Arnold, and T. S. Villamayor. 2010. A Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource Management. *Ecol. Soc.* **15**:38. [5]
- Crawford, S. E. S., and E. Ostrom. 1995. A Grammar of Institutions. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* **89**:582–600. [6]
- Crespi, B. J. 2001. The Evolution of Social Behavior in Microorganisms. *Trends Ecol. Evol.* **16**:178–183. [7]
- Croft, D. P., J. Krause, S. K. Darden, et al. 2009. Behavioural Trait Assortment in a Social Network: Patterns and Implications. *Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.* **63**:1495–1503. [12]
- Croson, R., and M. Marks. 2000. Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis. *Exp. Econ.* **2**:239–259. [3]
- Dall, S. R. X., A. I. Houston, and J. M. M. McNamara. 2004. The Behavioural Ecology of Personality: Consistent Individual Differences from an Adaptive Perspective. *Ecol. Lett.* **7**:734–739. [11]
- Dally, J. M., N. J. Emery, and N. S. Clayton. 2005. Cache Protection Strategies by Western Scrub-Jays *Aphelocoma californica*: Implications for Social Cognition. *Anim. Behav.* **70**:1251–1263. [11]
- Danchin, E., L.-A. Giraldeau, T. J. Valone, and R. H. Wagner. 2004. Public Information: From Nosy Neighbors to Cultural Evolution. *Science* **305**:487–491. [11]
- Darimont, C. T. 2015. The Unique Ecology of Human Predators. *Science* **349**:858. [6]
- Darley, J. M., and B. Latane. 1968. Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **8**:377–383. [3]
- Daugherty, M. D., and H. S. Malik. 2012. Rules of Engagement: Molecular Insights from Host-Virus Arms Races. *Annu. Rev. Genet.* **46**:677–700. [12]
- Davies, J. 1994. New Pathogens and Old Resistance Genes. *Microbiologia* **10**:9–12. [9]
- Davies, N. B. 2000. Cuckoos, Cowbirds and Other Cheats, Illustrated by David Quinn. London: T. & A. D. Poyser Ltd. [10]
- Davies, N. B., J. R. Krebs, and S. A. West. 2012. An Introduction to Behavioural Ecology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. [3]
- Davis, S. H., and A. Wali. 1994. Indigenous Land Tenure and Tropical Forest Management in Latin America. *Ambio* **23**:485–490. [5]
- Dawkins, R., and J. R. Krebs. 1979. Arms Races between and within Species. *Proc. Roy. Soc. B* **205**:489–511. [3]
- D’Costa, V., C. King, L. Kalan, et al. 2011. Antibiotic Resistance Is Ancient. *Nature* **477**:457–461. [9]
- Dechenaux, E., D. Kovenock, and R. M. Sheremeta. 2015. A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments. *Exp. Econ.* **18**:609–669. [3]
- Dhami, S. 2016. Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. [2]

- Diamond, J. 1989. Overview of Recent Extinctions. In: Conservation for the Twenty First Century, ed. D. Western and M. C. Pearl, pp. 37–41. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. [6]
- Díaz-Muñoz, S. L. 2011. Paternity and Relatedness in a Polyandrous Nonhuman Primate: Testing Adaptive Hypotheses of Male Reproductive Cooperation. *Anim. Behav.* **82**:563–571. [10]
- Diekmann, A. 1985. Volunteers Dilemma. *J. Conflict Resolut.* **29**:605–610. [3]
- . 1993. Cooperation in an Asymmetric Volunteers Dilemma Game: Theory and Experimental-Evidence. *Int. J. Game Theory* **22**:75–85. [3]
- di Falco, S., and E. Bulte. 2011. A Dark Side of Social Capital? Kinship, Consumption, and Savings. *J. Dev. Stud.* **47**:1128–1151. [3]
- Diggle, S. P., A. S. Griffin, G. S. Campbell, and S. A. West. 2007. Cooperation and Conflict in Quorum-Sensing Bacterial Populations. *Nature* **450**:411–414. [7]
- Dimitriu, T., C. Lotton, J. Bénard-Capelle, et al. 2014. Genetic Information Transfer Promotes Cooperation in Bacteria. *PNAS* **111**:11103–11108. [7, 10]
- Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman, and U. Sunde. 2012. The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk Attitudes. *Rev. Econ. Stud.* **79**:645–677. [2]
- Dong, H., Q. Xiang, Y. Gu, et al. 2014. Structural Basis for Outer Membrane Lipopolysaccharide Insertion. *Nature* **511**:52–56. [8]
- dos Santos, M., D. J. Rankin, and C. Wedekind. 2011. The Evolution of Punishment through Reputation. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **278**:371–377. [10]
- Dubois, F., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2003. The Forager’s Dilemma: Food Sharing and Food Defense as Risk-Sensitive Foraging Options. *Am. Nat.* **162**:768–779. [11]
- . 2004. Reduced Resource Defence in the Absence of Information: An Experimental Test Using Captive Nutmeg Mannikins. *Anim. Behav.* **68**:21–25. [11]
- . 2005. Fighting for Resources: The Economics of Defense and Appropriation. *Ecology* **86**:3–11. [4, 11]
- . 2007. Food Sharing among Retaliators: Sequential Arrivals and Information Asymmetries. *Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.* **62**:263–271. [11]
- Dubois, F., L.-A. Giraldeau, and J. W. A. Grant. 2003. Resource Defense in a Group-Foraging Context. *Behav. Ecol.* **14**:2–9. [11]
- Dubois, F., L.-A. Giraldeau, I. M. Hamilton, J. W. A. Grant, and L. Lefebvre. 2004. Distraction Sneakers Decrease the Expected Level of Aggression within Groups: A Game-Theoretic Model. *Am. Nat.* **164**:E32–E45. [11]
- Dubois, F., J. Morand-Ferron, and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2010. Learning in a Game Context: Strategy Choice by Some Keeps Learning from Evolving in Others. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **277**:3609–3616. [3, 11]
- Dugatkin, L. A. 1998. A Model of Coalition Formation in Animals. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **265**:2121–2125. [10]
- Dunbar, R. I. M. 2003. The Social Brain: Mind, Language, and Society in Evolutionary Perspective. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* **32**:163–181. [12]
- Dunbar, R. I. M., and S. Shultz. 2007. Evolution in the Social Brain. *Science* **317**:1344–1347. [12]
- Durante, R., L. Putterman, and J. van der Weele. 2014. Preferences for Redistribution and Perception of Fairness: An Experimental Study. *J. Eur. Econ. Assoc.* **12**:1059–1086. [3]
- Edmunds, D., and E. Wollenberg. 2003. Local Forest Management: The Impact of Devolution Policies. London: Earthscan. [5]

- Ehrhart, K. M., and C. Keser. 1999. Mobility and Cooperation: on the Run. Working Paper 99s-24. CIRANO Série Scientifique, <http://http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/99s-24.pdf>. (accessed Jan. 04, 2017). [12]
- Elgar, M. A. 1986. House Sparrows Establish Foraging Flocks by Giving Chirrup Calls If the Resources Are Divisible. *Anim. Behav.* **34**:169–174. [11]
- Ellingsen, T., M. Johannesson, J. Mollerstrom, and S. Munkhammar. 2012. Social Framing Effects: Preferences or Beliefs? *Games Econ. Behav.* **76**:117–130. [12]
- Elliot, M. 1978. Social Behavior and Foraging Ecology of the Eastern Chipmunk (*Tamias striatus*) in the Adirondack Mountains. *Smithson. Contrib. Zool.* **265**:1–107. [11]
- El Mouden, C., J. B. Andre, O. Morin, and D. Nettle. 2014. Cultural Transmission and the Evolution of Human Behaviour: A General Approach Based on the Price Equation. *J. Evol. Biol.* **27**:231–241. [3]
- Elster, J. 1989. *The Cement of Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [6]
- Embrey, M., G. R. Frechette, and S. Yuksel. 2016. Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Working Paper. *Social Science Research Network*, in press. [3]
- Engel, C. 2011. Dictator Games: A Meta Study. *Exp. Econ.* **14**:583–610. [3]
- Eshel, I., L. Samuelson, and A. Shaked. 1998. Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **88**:157–179. [2]
- Ewald, P. W. 1994. *Evolution of Infectious Disease*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. [9]
- . 2002. Virulence Management in Humans. In: *Adaptive Dynamics of Infectious Diseases: In Pursuit of Virulence Management*, ed. U. Dieckmann et al., pp. 399–412. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [9]
- Falk, A., and U. Fischbacher. 2006. A Theory of Reciprocity. *Games Econ. Behav.* **54**:293–315. [12]
- Falk, A., and M. Kosfeld. 2006. The Hidden Costs of Control. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **96**:1611–1630. [10]
- Falk, A., and N. Szech. 2013. Morals and Markets. *Science* **340**:707–711. [12]
- Farine, D. R., P. O. Montiglio, and O. Spiegel. 2015. From Individuals to Groups and Back: The Evolutionary Implications of Group Phenotypic Composition. *Trends Ecol. Evol.* **30**:609–621. [12]
- Fehr, E., and S. Gaechter. 2000. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **90**:980–994. [2, 3, 10]
- . 2002. Altruistic Punishment in Humans. *Nature* **415**:137–140. [10]
- Fehr, E., and K. M. Schmidt. 1999. A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. *Q. J. Econ.* **114**:817–868. [3, 6, 12]
- Fenichel, E. P. 2013. Economic Considerations for Social Distancing and Behavioral Based Policies During an Epidemic. *J. Health Econ.* **32**:440–451. [8]
- Ferri, M., E. Ranucci, P. Romagnoli, and V. Giaccone. 2015. Antimicrobial Resistance: A Global Emerging Threat to Public Health Systems. *Crit. Rev. Food Sci. Nutr.* **13**:1040–8398. [9]
- Fischbacher, U., and S. Gaechter. 2010. Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **100**:541–556. [3]
- Fischbacher, U., S. Gaechter, and E. Fehr. 2001. Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment. *Econ. Lett.* **71**:397–404. [2, 3, 11, 12]
- Flack, J. C., M. Girvan, F. B. M. de Waal, and D. C. Krakauer. 2006. Policing Stabilizes Construction of Social Niches in Primates. *Nature* **439**:426–429. [12]

- Floyd, J., and D. Pauly. 1984. Smaller Size Tuna around the Philippines: Can Fish Aggregating Devices Be Blamed? *Infofish Marketing Digest* 5:25–27. [6]
- Flynn, R., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2001. Producer-Scrounger Games in a Spatially Explicit World: Tactic Use Influences Flock Geometry of Spice Finches. *Ethology* 107:249–257. [3, 11]
- Fosco, C., and F. Mengel. 2011. Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks. *J. Econ. Dyn. Control* 35:641–658. [2]
- Foster, D. P., and P. H. Young. 2006. Regret Testing: Learning to Play Nash Equilibrium without Knowing You Have an Opponent. *Theor. Econ.* 1:341–367. [3]
- Foster, G., and P. Frijters. 2016. Behavioral Political Economy. In: *Routledge Handbook of Behavioral Economics*, ed. R. Frantz et al., pp. 348–364. London: Routledge. [10]
- Foster, K. R., T. Wenseleers, and F. L. W. Ratnieks. 2001. Spite: Hamilton’s Unproven Theory. *Ann. Zool. Fenn.* 38:229–238. [12]
- Frank, S. A. 2003. Repression of Competition and the Evolution of Cooperation. *Evolution* 57:693–705. [4]
- Franz, M., and C. L. Nunn. 2009. Network-Based Diffusion Analysis: A New Method for Detecting Social Learning. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* 276:1829–1836. [12]
- Frijters, P., and G. Foster. 2013. *An Economic Theory of Greed, Love, Groups, and Networks*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [10]
- Fudenberg, D., and D. K. Levine. 1998. *The Theory of Learning in Games*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [3]
- Fürtbauer, I., A. Pond, M. Heistermann, and A. J. King. 2015. Personality, Plasticity and Predation: Linking Endocrine and Behavioural Reaction Norms in Stickleback Fish. *Funct. Ecol.* 29:931–940. [12]
- Gächter, S. 2007. Conditional Cooperation: Behavioural Regularities from the Lab and the Field and Their Policy Implications. In: *Psychology and Economics: A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field*, ed. B. S. Frey and A. Stutzer, pp. 19–50. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [3]
- Gächter, S., and E. Renner. 2014. Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. Secondary Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19126664. (accessed Aug. 18, 2016). [6]
- Gächter, S., E. Renner, and M. Sefton. 2008. The Long-Run Benefits of Punishment. *Science* 322:1510. [2]
- Gächter, S., and C. Thöni. 2010. Social Comparison and Performance: Experimental Evidence on the Fair Wage–Effort Hypothesis. *J. Econ. Behav. Organ.* 76:531–543. [12]
- Gardner, A., S. A. West, and G. Wild. 2011. The Genetical Theory of Kin Selection. *J. Evol. Biol.* 24:1020–1043. [3, 7]
- Garfinkel, M. R., and S. Skaperdas. 2006. *Economics of Conflict: An Overview*. University of California-Irvine, Dept. of Economics, Working Paper Nr. 050623. Irvine: Univ. of California. [12]
- Gautam, A. P., and A. G. Shivakoti. 2005. Conditions for Successful Local Collective Action in Forestry: Some Evidence from the Hills of Nepal. *Soc. Nat. Resour.* 18:153–171. [5]
- Geist, H. J., and E. F. Lambin. 2002. Proximate Causes and Underlying Driving Forces of Tropical Deforestation. *Bioscience* 52:143–150. [5]

- Gelfand, M. J., J. L. Raver, L. Nishii, et al. 2011. Differences between Tight and Loose Cultures: A 33-Nation Study. *Science* **332**:1100–1104. [12]
- Ghate, R., and H. Nagendra. 2005. Role of Monitoring in Institutional Performance: Forest Management in Maharashtra, India. *Conserv. Soc.* **3**:509–532. [5]
- Gintis, H. 2010. Social Norms as Choreography. *Polit. Philos. Econ.* **9**:251–264. [12]
- Giraldeau, L.-A., and G. Beauchamp. 1999. Food Exploitation: Searching for the Optimal Joining Policy. *Trends Ecol. Evol.* **14**:102–106. [12]
- Giraldeau, L.-A., and T. Caraco. 2000. Social Foraging Theory. Monographs in Behavior and Ecology. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. [3, 4]
- Giraldeau, L.-A., and F. Dubois. 2008. Social Foraging and the Study of Exploitative Behavior. *Adv. Study Behav.* **38**:59–104. [3, 4, 11]
- Giraldeau, L.-A., T. J. Valone, and J. J. Templeton. 2002. Potential Disadvantages of Using Socially Acquired Information. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* **357**:1559–1566. [11]
- Giraud, T., J. S. Pedersen, and L. Keller. 2002. Evolution of Supercolonies: The Argentine Ants of Southern Europe. *PNAS* **99**:6075–6079. [10]
- Glaeser, E., B. Sacerdote, and J. Scheinkman. 1996. Crime and Social Interactions. *Q. J. Econ.* **111**:507–548. [2]
- Goette, L., D. Huffman, and S. Meier. 2006. The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Social Groups. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **96**:212–216. [10]
- Goldberg, J. L., J. W. A. Grant, and L. Lefebvre. 2001. Effects of the Temporal Predictability and Spatial Clumpiness of Food on the Intensity of Competitive Aggression in Zenaidura Dove. *Behav. Ecol.* **12**:490–495. [11]
- Goodale, E., G. Beauchamp, R. D. Magrath, J. C. Nieh, and G. D. Ruxton. 2010. Interspecific Information Transfer Influences Animal Community Structure. *Trends Ecol. Evol.* **25**:354–361. [11]
- Gough, E., H. Shaikh, and A. R. Manges. 2011. Systematic Review of Intestinal Microbiota Transplantation (Fecal Bacteriotherapy) for Recurrent *Clostridium difficile* Infection. *Clin. Infect. Dis.* **53**:994–1002. [7]
- Goyal, S. 2007. Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. [2]
- Grafen, A. 2006. Optimization of Inclusion Fitness. *J. Theor. Biol.* **238**:541–563. [3]
- Grechenig, K., A. Nicklisch, and C. Thöni. 2010. Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt: A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions under Uncertainty. *J. Empir. Leg. Stud.* **7**:847–867. [10]
- Green, E. J., and R. H. Porter. 1984. Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. *Econometrica* **52**:87–100. [2]
- Griffin, A. S., S. A. West, and A. Buckling. 2004. Cooperation and Competition in Pathogenic Bacteria. *Nature* **430**:1024–1027. [7]
- Grimm, V., and F. Mengel. 2012. An Experiment on Learning in a Multiple Games Environment. *J. Econ. Theory* **147**:2220–2259. [2]
- Gross, M. R. 1996. Alternative Reproductive Strategies and Tactics: Diversity within Sexes. *Trends Ecol. Evol.* **11**:92–98. [12]
- Grzelak, J. L., M. Poppe, Z. Czwartosz, and A. Nowak. 1988. Numerical Trap: A New Look at Outcome Representation in Studies on Choice Behavior. *Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.* **18**:143–159. [3]
- Guala, F., L. Mittone, and M. Ploner. 2013. Group Membership, Team Preferences, and Expectations. *J. Econ. Behav. Organ.* **86**:183–190. [12]
- Guererk, O., B. Irlenbusch, and B. Rockenbach. 2006. The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions. *Science* **312**:108–111. [2]

- Gulati, R. 1998. Alliances and Networks. *Strategic Manag. J.* **19**:293–317. [12]
- Guth, W., and M. G. Kocher. 2014. More Than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature. *J. Econ. Behav. Organ.* **108**:396–409. [3]
- Hajjar, R., J. A. Oldekop, A. Agrawal, et al. 2016. The Data Not Collected on Community Forestry. *Conserv. Biol.* DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12732. [5]
- Hamblin, S., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2009. Finding the Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rule for Frequency-Dependent Foraging. *Anim. Behav.* **78**:1343–1350. [3]
- Hamblin, S., K. J. Mathot, J. Morand-Ferron, et al. 2010. Predator Inadvertent Social Information Use Favours Reduced Clumping of Its Prey. *Oikos* **119**:286–291. [11]
- Hamilton, I. M. 2002. Kleptoparasitism and the Distribution of Unequal Competitors. *Behav. Ecol.* **13**:260–267. [3, 4]
- Hamilton, W. D. 1964. The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour: I and II. *J. Theor. Biol.* **7**:1–52. [3, 4, 7]
- Hansen, M. C., P. V. Potapov, R. Moore, et al. 2013. High-Resolution Global Maps of 21st-Century Forest Cover Change. *Science* **342**:850–853. [5]
- Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science* **162**:1243. [5, 6, 8, 9, 12]
- Hare, B., J. Call, B. Agnetta, and M. Tomasello. 2000. Chimpanzees Know What Conspecifics Do and Do Not See. *Anim. Behav.* **59**:771–785. [11]
- Harley, C. B. 1981. Learning the Evolutionary Stable Strategies. *J. Theor. Biol.* **89**:611–633. [3, 11]
- Hart, K. 1975. Swindler or Public Benefactor? The Entrepreneur in His Community. In: *Changing Social Structure in Ghana*, ed. J. Good, pp. 1–35. London: International African Institute. [3]
- Hartner, M., S. Rechberger, E. Kirchler, and A. Schabmann. 2008. Procedural Fairness and Tax Compliance. *Econ. Anal. Policy* **38**:137–152. [12]
- Hede, K. 2014. Antibiotic Resistance: An Infectious Arms Race. *Nature* **509**:S2–3. [9]
- Heinrich, B., and J. M. Marzluff. 1991. Do Common Ravens Yell Because They Want to Attract Others? *Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.* **28**:13–21. [11]
- Heller, Y. 2015. Three Steps Ahead. *Theor. Econ.* **10**:203–241. [3]
- Henrich, B., and J. W. Pepper. 1998. Influence of Competitors on Caching Behaviour in the Common Raven, *Corvus corax*. *Anim. Behav.* **56**:1083–1090. [11]
- Henrich, J. 2004. Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Processes and Large-Scale Cooperation. *J. Econ. Behav. Organ.* **53**:3–35. [3]
- Henrich, J., J. Ensminger, R. McElreath, et al. 2010. Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment. *Science* **327**:1480–1484. [12]
- Hentzer, M., H. Wu, J. B. Andersen, et al. 2003. Attenuation of *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* Virulence by Quorum Sensing Inhibitors. *EMBO J.* **22**:3803–3815. [7]
- Herrmann, B., C. Thoeni, and S. Gaechter. 2008. Antisocial Punishment across Societies. *Science* **319**:1362–1367. [2]
- Herrmann, M. 2010. Monopoly Pricing of an Antibiotic Subject to Bacterial Resistance. *J. Health Econ.* **29**:137–150. [8, 9]
- Herrmann, M., and G. Gaudet. 2009. The Economic Dynamics of Antibiotic Efficacy under Open Access. *J. Environ. Econ. Manage.* **57**:334–350. [8, 9]
- Herrmann, M., and R. Laxminarayan. 2010. Antibiotic Effectiveness: New Challenges in Natural Resource Management. *Annu. Rev. Res. Econ.* **2**:125–138. [8]
- Herrmann, M., B. Nkuiya, and A.-R. Dussault. 2013. Innovation and Antibiotic Use within Antibiotic Classes: Market Incentives and Economic Instruments. *Resource Ener. Econ.* **50**:267–284. [8]

- Hijmans, R. J., S. E. Cameron, J. L. Parra, P. G. Jones, and A. Jarvis. 2005. Very High Resolution Interpolated Climate Surfaces for Global Land Areas. *Int. J. Climatol.* **25**:1965–1978. [5]
- Hilbe, C., and K. Sigmund. 2010. Incentives and Opportunism: From the Carrot to the Stick. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **277**:2427–2433. [10]
- Hilborn, R., and C. J. Walters, eds. 1992. Quantitative Fisheries Stock Assessment: Choice, Dynamics and Uncertainty. London: Chapman & Hall. [6]
- Hirshleifer, J. 1989. Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio Vs Difference Models of Relative Success. *Public Choice* **63**:101–112. [12]
- . 1991. The Technology of Conáict as an Economic Activity. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **81**:130–134. [12]
- Hoare, D. J., J. Krause, N. Peuhkuri, and J. G. J. Godin. 2000a. Body Size and Shoaling in Fish. *J. Fish Biol.* **57**:1351–1366. [12]
- Hoare, D. J., G. D. Ruxton, J. G. J. Godin, and J. Krause. 2000b. The Social Organization of Free-Ranging Fish Shoals. *Oikos* **89**:546–554. [12]
- Hopkins, E. 2002. Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games. *Econometrica* **70**:2141–2166. [3]
- Hoppitt, W., and K. N. Laland. 2011. Detecting Social Learning Using Networks: A Users Guide. *Am. J. Primatol.* **73**:834–844. [12]
- Houston, A. I., and J. M. M. McNamara. 1999. Models of Adaptive Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [4]
- Howard, D. H. 2004. Resistance-Induced Antibiotic Substitution. *Health Econ.* **13**:585–595. [8]
- . 2005. Life Expectancy and the Value of Early Detection. *J. Health Econ.* **24**:891–906. [8]
- Huck, S. 1998. Trust, Treason, and Trials: An Example of How the Evolution of Preferences Can Be Driven by Legal Institutions. *J. Law Econ. Organ.* **14**:44–60. [2]
- Huck, S., and M. Kosfeld. 2007. The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement. *Econ. J.* **117**:270–286. [2]
- Hughes, W. O. H., and J. J. Boomsma. 2008. Genetic Royal Cheats in Leaf-Cutting Ant Societies. *PNAS* **105**:5150–5153. [10]
- Hurwicz, L., and S. Reiter. 2006. Designing Economic Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [3]
- Hwang, S.-H. 2009. Contest Success Functions: Theory and Evidence. Economics Department Working Paper Series, Paper Nr. 11. Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts-Amherst. [12]
- Isaac, R. M., J. M. Walker, and S. H. Thomas. 1984. Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations. *Public Choice* **43**:113–149. [3]
- Isbell, L. A. 1991. Contest and Scramble Competition: Patterns of Female Aggression and Ranging Behavior among Primates. *Behav. Ecol.* **2**:143–155. [12]
- Jacquet, J., and D. Pauly. 2008. Funding Priorities: Big Barriers to Small-Scale Fisheries. *Conserv. Biol.* **22**:832–835. [6]
- Janssen, M. A., R. Holahan, A. Lee, and E. Ostrom. 2010. Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems. *Science* **328**:613–617. [4]
- Jehiel, P. 2001. Limited Foresight May Force Cooperation. *Rev. Econ. Stud.* **68**:369–391. [3]
- . 2005. Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium. *J. Econ. Theory* **123**:81–104. [2, 3]

- Jenkins, R. K. B., A. Keane, A. R. Rakotoarivelo, et al. 2011. Analysis Patterns of Bushmeat Consumption Reveals Extensive Exploitation of Protected Species in Eastern Madagascar. *PLoS One* **6**:e27570. [5]
- Jenkins, S. H., A. Rothstein, and W. C. H. Green. 1995. Food Hoarding by Merriam's Kangaroo Rats: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses. *Ecology* **76**:2470–2481. [11]
- Johnson, C. 2001. Community Formation and Fisheries Conservation in Southern Thailand. *Dev. Change* **32**:951–974. [5]
- Johnstone, R. A. 2001. Eavesdropping and Animal Conflict. *PNAS* **98**:9177–9180. [11]
- Johnstone, R. A., and L. A. Dugatkin. 2000. Coalition Formation in Animals and the Nature of Winner and Loser Effects. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **267**:17–21. [10]
- Jones, G. P. 1983. Relationship between Density and Behaviour in Juvenile *Pseudolabrus celidotus* (Pisces: Labridae). *Anim. Behav.* **31**:729–735. [11]
- Kacelnik, A. 2006. Meanings of Rationality. In: Rational Animals?, ed. S. N. Hurley, M., pp. 87–106. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. [3]
- Kameda, T., and D. Nakanishi. 2002. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Social/Cultural Learning in a Nonstationary Uncertain Environment: An Evolutionary Simulation and an Experiment with Human Subjects. *Evol. Hum. Behav.* **23**:373–393. [12]
- Kameda, T., T. Tsukasaki, R. Hastie, and N. Berg. 2011. Democracy under Uncertainty: The Wisdom of Crowds and the Free-Rider Problem in Group Decision Making. *Psychol. Rev.* **118**:76–96. [12]
- Karandikar, R., D. Mokherjee, D. Ray, and F. V. Redondo. 1998. Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation. *J. Econ. Theory* **80**:292–331. [2]
- Katsnelson, E., U. Motro, M. W. Feldman, and A. Lotem. 2008. Early Experience Affects Producer-Scrounger Foraging Tendencies in the House Sparrow. *Anim. Behav.* **75**:1465–1472. [3]
- . 2011. Individual-Learning Ability Predicts Social-Foraging Strategy in House Sparrows. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **278**:582–589. [3]
- Keeling, M. J., and K. T. D. Eames. 2005. Networks and Epidemic Models. *J. R. Soc. Interface* **2**:295–307. [12]
- Kendal, J., L.-A. Giraldeau, and K. Laland. 2009. The Evolution of Social Learning Rules: Payoff-Biased and Frequency-Dependent Biased Transmission. *J. Theor. Biol.* **260**:210–219. [3]
- Kerth, G. 2010. Group Decision-Making in Animal Societies. In: Animal Behaviour: Evolution and Mechanisms, ed. P. Kappeler, pp. 241–265. Berlin: Springer [12]
- Kerth, G., C. Ebert, and C. Schmidtke. 2006. Group Decision Making in Fission-Fusion Societies: Evidence from Two-Field Experiments in Bechstein's Bats. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **273**:2785–2790. [12]
- Kiester, A. R., T. Nagylaki, and B. Shaffer. 1981. Population Dynamics of Species with Synogenetic Sibling Species. *Theor. Popul. Biol.* **19**:358–369. [6]
- Kilner, R. M., and N. E. Langmore. 2011. Cuckoos versus Hosts in Insects and Birds: Adaptations, Counter-Adaptations and Outcomes. *Biological Reviews* **86**:836–852. [12]
- King, A. J., F. E. Clark, and G. Cowlshaw. 2011. The Dining Etiquette of Desert Baboons: The Roles of Social Bonds, Kinship, and Dominance in Co-Feeding Networks. *Am. J. Primatol.* **73**:768–774. [12]
- King, A. J., and G. Cowlshaw. 2007. When to Use Social Information: The Advantage of Large Group Size in Individual Decision Making. *Biol. Lett.* **3**:137–139. [12]
- King, A. J., C. M. S. Douglas, E. Huchard, N. J. B. Isaac, and G. Cowlshaw. 2008. Dominance and Affiliation Mediate Despotism in a Social Primate. *Curr. Biol.* **18**:1833–1838. [12]

- King, A. J., N. J. B. Isaac, and G. Cowlshaw. 2009. Ecological, Social, and Reproductive Factors Shape Producer-Scrounger Dynamics in Baboons. *Behav. Ecol.* **20**:1039–1049. [12]
- King, A. J., and C. Sueur. 2011. Where Next? Group Coordination and Collective Decision Making by Primates. *Int. J. Primatol.* **32**:1245–1267. [12]
- King, A. J., L. J. Williams, and C. Mettke-Hofmann. 2015. The Effects of Social Conformity on Gouldian Finch Personality. *Anim. Behav.* **99**:25–31. [12]
- Koita, O. A., O. K. Doumbo, A. Ouattara, et al. 2012. False-Negative Rapid Diagnostic Tests for Malaria and Deletion of the Histidine-Rich Repeat Region of the Hrp2 Gene. *Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg.* **86**:194–198. [9]
- Kokko, H., K. U. Heubel, and D. J. Rankin. 2008. How Populations Persist When Asexuality Requires Sex: The Spatial Dynamics of Coping with Sperm Parasites. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **275**: 817–825. [6]
- Kokko, H., R. A. Johnstone, and T. H. Clutton-Brock. 2001. The Evolution of Cooperative Breeding through Group Augmentation. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **268**:187–196. [3]
- Koops, M. A., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 1996. Producer-Scrounger Foraging Games in Starlings: A Test of Rate-Maximizing and Risk-Sensitive Models. *Anim. Behav.* **51**:773–783. [3]
- Kosfeld, M., and S. Neckermann. 2011. Getting More Work for Nothing? Symbolic Awards and Worker Performance. *Am. Econ. J. Microecon.* **3**:86–99. [3]
- Kosfeld, M., A. Okada, and A. Riedl. 2009. Institution Formation in Public Goods Games. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **99**:1335–1355. [2, 12]
- Kosfeld, M., and D. Rustagi. 2015. Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopia. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **105**:747–783. [5, 6]
- Kreps, D. M. 1988. Notes on the Theory of Choice. Boulder: Westview Press. [3]
- Kreps, D. M., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson. 1982. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Dilemma Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. *J. Econ. Theory* **252**:245–252. [2, 3]
- Krueger, A. B., and A. Mas. 2004. Strikes, Scabs, and Tread Separations: Labor Strife and the Production of Defective Bridgestone/Firestone Tires. *J. Polit. Econ.* **112**:253–289. [10]
- Kruuk, H. 1972. The Spotted Hyena. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. [11]
- Kuhn, H. W., J. C. Harsanyi, R. Selten, et al. 1996. The Work of John Nash in Game Theory: Nobel Seminar, Dec. 8, 1994. *J. Econ. Theory* **69**:153–185. [3]
- Kummerli, R., and S. P. Brown. 2010. Molecular and Regulatory Properties of a Public Good Shape the Evolution of Cooperation. *PNAS* **107**:18921–18926. [7]
- Kummerli, R., and A. Ross-Gillespie. 2014. Explaining the Sociobiology of Pyoverdinin Producing *Pseudomonas*: A Comment on Zhang and Rainey (2013). *Evolution* **68**:3337–3343. [7]
- Kupper, C., M. Stocks, J. E. Risse, et al. 2016. A Supergene Determines Highly Divergent Male Reproductive Morphs in the Ruff. *Nat. Genet.* **48**:79–83. [3]
- Lahti, K., K. Koivula, S. Rytönen, et al. 1998. Social Influences on Food Caching in Willow Tits: A Field Experiment. *Behav. Ecol.* **9**:122–129. [11]
- Lange, A., and R. Dukas. 2009. Bayesian Approximations and Extensions: Optimal Decisions for Small Brains and Possibly Big Ones Too. *J. Theor. Biol.* **259**:503–516. [3]

- Lank, D. B., C. M. Smith, O. Hanotte, T. Burke, and F. Cooke. 1995. Genetic Polymorphism for Alternative Mating-Behavior in Lekking Male Ruff *Philomachus pugnax*. *Nature* **378**:59–62. [3]
- Laskowski, K. L., and J. N. Pruitt. 2014. Evidence of Social Niche Construction: Persistent and Repeated Social Interactions Generate Stronger Personalities in a Social Spider. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **281**:7. [12]
- Laxminarayan, R., and G. M. Brown. 2001. Economics of Antibiotic Resistance: A Theory of Optimal Use. *J. Environ. Econ. Manage.* **42**:183–206. [8]
- Laxminarayan, R., and M. Herrmann. 2015. Biological Resistance. In: Handbook on the Economics of Natural Resources, ed. R. Halvorsen and D. F. Layton, pp. 249–278. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. [8]
- Laxminarayan, R., A. Malani, D. H. Howard, and D. L. Smith. 2007. Extending the Cure: Policy Responses to the Growing Threat of Antibiotic Resistance. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. [8]
- Laxminarayan, R., and D. L. Smith. 2006. Ecology and Economics of Cycling Antibiotics: Insights from Mathematical Modeling. In: Multiple Drug Resistant Bacteria, ed. C.-A. Cuevas, pp. 167–178. Norwich: Horizon Scientific Press. [8]
- Laxminarayan, R., and M. L. Weitzman. 2002. On the Implications of Endogenous Resistance to Medications. *J. Health Econ.* **21**:709–718. [8]
- Leaver, L. A., L. Hopewell, C. Caldwell, and L. Mallarky. 2007. Audience Effects on Food Caching in Grey Squirrels (*Sciurus carolinensis*): Evidence for Pilferage Avoidance Strategies. *Anim. Cogn.* **10**:23–27. [11]
- Ledyard, J. O. 1995. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research. In: Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, pp. 111–194. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. [2, 6,10]
- Leggett, H. C., S. P. Brown, and S. E. Reece. 2014. War and Peace: Social Interactions in Infections. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* **369**: [7, 9]
- Lehmann, L., and M. W. Feldman. 2009. Coevolution of Adaptive Technology, Maladaptive Culture and Population Size in a Producer-Scrounger Game. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **276**:3853–3862. [3]
- Lehmann, L., L. Keller, S. West, and D. Roze. 2007. Group Selection and Kin Selection: Two Concepts but One Process. *PNAS* **104**:6736–6739. [3]
- Le Kama, A. A., and K. Schubert. 2007. A Note on the Consequences of an Endogenous Discounting Depending on the Environmental Quality. *Macroecon. Dyn.* **11**:272–289. [9]
- Lendvai, A. Z., Z. Barta, A. Liker, and V. Bokony. 2004. The Effect of Energy Reserves on Social Foraging: Hungry Sparrows Scrounge More. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **271**:2467–2472. [3]
- Levin, B. R., and J. J. Bull. 2004. Population and Evolutionary Dynamics of Phage Therapy. *Nat. Rev. Microbiol.* **2**:166–173. [7]
- Lewis, S. L., and M. A. Maslin. 2015. Defining the Anthropocene. *Nature* **519**:171–180. [4]
- Liebrand, W. B. G., and C. G. McClintock. 1988. The Ring Measure of Social Values - Computerized Procedure for Assessing Individual-Differences in Information-Processing and Social Value Orientation. *Eur. J. Personality* **2**:217–230. [3]
- Lindbeck, A., S. Nyberg, and J. Weibull. 1999. Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State. *Q. J. Econ.* **CXIV**:1–35. [2]
- Lotem, A., M. A. Fishman, and L. Stone. 1999. Evolution of Cooperation between Individuals. *Nature* **400**:226–227. [2]

- Loukola, O. J., T. Laaksonen, J.-T. Seppänen, and J. T. Forsman. 2014. Active Hiding of Social Information from Information-Parasites. *BMC Evol. Biol.* **14**:32. [11]
- Lucas, J. R., R. D. Howard, and J. G. Palmer. 1996. Callers and Satellites: Chorus Behaviour in Anurans as a Stochastic Dynamic Game. *Anim. Behav.* **51**:501–518. [3]
- Maeda, T., R. Garcia-Contreras, M. Pu, et al. 2012. Quorum Quenching Quandary: Resistance to Antivirulence Compounds. *ISME J.* **6**:493–501. [7]
- Manson, J. H., and R. W. Wrangham. 1991. Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and Humans. *Curr. Anthropol.* **32**:369–390. [12]
- Marshall, J. A. R. 2011. Group Selection and Kin Selection: Formally Equivalent Approaches. *Trends Ecol. Evol.* **26**:325–332. [3]
- Mas, A. 2008. Labour Unrest and the Quality of Production: Evidence from the Construction Equipment Resale Market. *Rev. Econ. Stud.* **75**:229–258. [10]
- Masiero, G., M. Filippini, M. Ferech, and H. Goossens. 2010. Socioeconomic Determinants of Outpatient Antibiotic Use in Europe. *Int. J. Pub. Health* **55**:469–478. [8]
- Mathot, K. J., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2010. Within-Group Relatedness Can Lead to Higher Levels of Exploitation: A Model and Empirical Test. *Behav. Ecol.* **21**:843–850. [3, 4, 10]
- Mathot, K. J., S. Godde, V. Careau, D. W. Thomas, and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2009. Testing Dynamic Variance-Sensitive Foraging Using Individual Differences in Basal Metabolic Rates of Zebra Finches. *Oikos* **118**:545–552. [3]
- Matsumura, K., S. Matsunaga, and N. Fusetani. 2007. Phosphatidylcholine Profile-Mediated Group Recognition in Catfish. *J. Exp. Biol.* **210**:1992–1999. [12]
- Maynard-Smith, J. 1982. *Evolution and the Theory of Games*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [3, 11]
- Maynard-Smith, J., and G. R. Price. 1973. The Logic of Animal Conflict. *Nature* **246**:15–18. [2, 3, 11]
- McCormack, J. E., P. G. Jablonski, and J. L. Brown. 2007. Producer-Scrounger Roles and Joining Based on Dominance in a Free-Living Group of Mexican Jays (*Aphelocoma ultramarina*). *Behaviour* **144**:967–982. [3]
- McGinty, S. E., D. J. Rankin, and S. P. Brown. 2011. Horizontal Gene Transfer and the Evolution of Bacterial Cooperation. *Evolution* **65**:21–32. [10]
- McNally, L., and S. P. Brown. 2015. Building the Microbiome in Health and Disease: Niche Construction and Social Conflict in Bacteria. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* **370**: [7]
- McNally, L., M. Viana, and S. P. Brown. 2014. Cooperative Secretions Facilitate Host Range Expansion in Bacteria. *Nat. Commun.* **5**:4594. [7]
- McNamara, J. M. 2013. Towards a Richer Evolutionary Game Theory. *J. R. Soc. Interface* **10**:20130544. [3, 11]
- McNamara, J. M. and A. I. Houston. 1989. State-Dependent Contests for Food. *J. Theor. Biol.* **137**:457–479. [4]
- McNamara, J. M., P. A. Stephens, S. R. X. Dall, and A. I. Houston. 2009. Evolution of Trust and Trustworthiness: Social Awareness Favours Personality Differences. *Proc. Biol. Sci.* **276**:605–613. [11]
- Mechoulan, S. 2007. Market Structure and Communicable Diseases. *Can. J. Econ.* **40**:468–492. [8]
- Mellbye, B., and M. Schuster. 2011. The Sociomicrobiology of Antivirulence Drug Resistance: A Proof of Concept. *Mbio* **2**: [7]

- Mellström, C., and M. Johannesson. 2008. Crowding out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right? *J. Eur. Econ. Assoc.* **6**:845–863. [10]
- Mengel, F. 2008. Matching Structure and the Cultural Transmission of Social Norms. *J. Econ. Behav. Organ.* **67**:608–623. [2, 12]
- . 2009. Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model. *J. Evol. Econ.* **19**:397–415. [2]
- . 2012. Learning across Games. *Games Econ. Behav.* **74**:601–619. [2, 3]
- Mesoudi, A. 2011. Cultural Evolution How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. [3]
- Mesterton-Gibbons, M., S. Gavrilets, J. Gravner, and E. Akcay. 2011. Models of Coalition or Alliance Formation. *J. Theor. Biol.* **274**:187–204. [10]
- Meyfroidt, P., and E. F. Lambin. 2011. Global Forest Transition: Prospects for an End to Deforestation. *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.* **36**:343–371. [5]
- Milinski, M., C. Hilbe, D. Semmann, R. Sommerfeld, and J. Marotzke. 2016. Humans Choose Representatives Who Enforce Cooperation in Social Dilemmas through Extortion. *Nat. Commun.* **7**:10915 [3]
- Molnar, A., D. Gomes, R. Sousa, et al. 2008. Community Forest Enterprise Markets in Mexico and Brazil: New Opportunities and Challenges for Legal Access to the Forest. *J. Sust. Forestry* **27**:87–121. [5]
- Moore, J. 2002. Parasites and the Behavior of Animals. Oxford Series in Ecology and Evolution. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. [3]
- Morand-Ferron, J., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2010. Learning Behaviorally Stable Solutions to Producer-Scrounger Games. *Behav. Ecol.* **21**:343–348. [3, 12]
- Morand-Ferron, J., L.-A. Giraldeau, and L. Lefebvre. 2007. Wild Carib Grackles Play a Producer-Scrounger Game. *Behav. Ecol.* **18**:916–921. [3]
- Morand-Ferron, J., G. M. Wu, and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2011. Persistent Individual Differences in Tactic Use in a Producer-Scrounger Game Are Group Dependent. *Anim. Behav.* **82**:811–816. [3]
- Morgan, A. D., B. J. Z. Quigley, S. P. Brown, and A. Buckling. 2012. Selection on Non-Social Traits Limits the Invasion of Social Cheats. *Ecol. Lett.* **15**:841–846. [7]
- Mossong, J., N. Hens, M. Jit, et al. 2008. Social Contacts and Mixing Patterns Relevant to the Spread of Infectious Diseases. *PloS Medicine* **5**:381–391. [12]
- Mottley, K., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2000. Experimental Evidence That Group Foragers Can Converge on Predicted Producer-Scrounger Equilibria. *Anim. Behav.* **60**:341–350. [3]
- Munro, G. R. 1979. The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources. *Can. J. Econ.* **12**:355–376. [6]
- Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1991. The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth. *Q. J. Econ.* **106**:503–530. [10]
- . 1993. Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **83**:409–414. [3]
- Murphy, R. O., and K. A. Ackermann. 2014. Social Value Orientation: Theoretical and Measurement Issues in the Study of Social Preferences. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev.* **18**:13–41. [3]
- Murphy, R. O., K. A. Ackermann, and M. J. J. Handgraaf. 2011. Measuring Social Value Orientation. *Judgm. Decis. Mak.* **6**:771–781. [3]

- Murray, C. K., P. Frijters, and M. Vorster. 2015. Give and You Shall Receive: Emergence of Loyalty and Groups in a Repeated Rent-Allocation Game. Secondary Give and You Shall Receive: Emergence of Loyalty and Groups in a Repeated Rent-Allocation Game. <http://ftp.iza.org/dp9010.pdf>. (accessed Aug. 25, 2016). [10]
- Nafziger, E. W. 1969. Effect of Nigerian Extended Family on Entrepreneurial Activity. *Econ. Dev. Cult. Change* **18**:25–33. [3]
- Nagendra, H., M. Karmacharya, and B. Karna. 2005. Evaluating Forest Management in Nepal: Views across Space and Time. *Ecol. Soc.* **10**:24–40. [5]
- Nash, J. F. 1950. Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. *PNAS* **36**:48–49. [3]
- Nax, H. H., M. N. Burton-Chellew, S. A. West, and H. P. Young. 2016. Learning in a Black Box. *J. Econ. Behav. Organ.* **127**:1–15. [3]
- Newman, M. E. J. 2002. Spread of Epidemic Disease on Networks. *Physical Review E* **66**:016128 [12]
- Newton, P., J. A. Oldekop, G. Brodnig, B. Karna, and A. Agrawal. 2016. Carbon, Biodiversity, and Livelihoods in Forest Commons: Synergies, Trade-Offs, and Implications for REDD+. *Environmental Research Letters* **11**:044017. [5]
- Nogueira, T., D. J. Rankin, M. Touchon, et al. 2009. Horizontal Gene Transfer of the Secretome Drives the Evolution of Bacterial Cooperation and Virulence. *Curr. Biol.* **19**:1683–1691. [7]
- Noldeke, G., and L. Samuelson. 1993. An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction. *Games Econ. Behav.* **5**:425–454. [3]
- Nowak, M. A., and K. Sigmund. 1998. Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring. *Nature* **393**:573–577. [2]
- Nowak, M. A., C. E. Tarnita, and E. O. Wilson. 2010. The Evolution of Eusociality. *Nature* **466**:1057–1062. [3]
- Ochman, H., J. G. Lawrence, and E. A. Groisman. 2000. Lateral Gene Transfer and the Nature of Bacterial Innovation. *Nature* **405**:299–304. [12]
- Ockenfels, A., and P. Werner. 2014. Beliefs and Ingroup Favoritism. *J. Econ. Behav. Organ.* **108**:453–462. [12]
- Ohtsuki, H., C. Hauert, E. Lieberman, and M. A. Nowak. 2006. A Simple Rule for the Evolution of Cooperation on Graphs and Social Networks. *Nature* **441**:502–505. [12]
- Oldekop, J. A., A. J. Bebbington, D. Brockington, and R. F. Preziosi. 2010. Understanding the Lessons and Limitations of Conservation and Development. *Conserv. Biol. Pract.* **24**:461–469. [5]
- Oldekop, J. A., A. J. Bebbington, K. Hennermann, et al. 2013. Evaluating the Effects of Common Pool Resource Institutions and Market Forces on Species Richness and Forest Cover in Ecuadorian Indigenous Kichwa Communities. *Conserv. Lett.* **6**:107–115. [5]
- Oldekop, J. A., A. J. Bebbington, N. K. Truelove, et al. 2012. Environmental Impacts and Scarcity Perception Influence Local Institutions in Indigenous Amazonian Kichwa Communities. *Hum. Ecol.* **40**:101–115. [5]
- Oldekop, J. A., L. B. Fontana, J. Grugel, et al. 2016. 100 Key Research Questions for the Post-2015 Development Agenda. *Dev. Policy Rev.* **34**:55–82. [5]
- Oliver, P. E. 1993. Formal Models of Collective Action. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* **19**:271–300. [12]
- Olson, M. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action : Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard Economic Studies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. [3]

- Ostrom, E. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. [4–6]
- . 2007. A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas. *PNAS* **104**:15181–15187. [3]
- . 2009. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. *Science* **325**:419–422. [5]
- Ostrom, E., and H. Nagendra. 2006. Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and People from the Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory *PNAS* **103**:19224–19231. [6]
- Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner. 1992. Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* **86**:404–417. [10]
- Oyono, P. R. 2005. Profiling Local-Level Outcomes of Environmental Decentralizations: The Case of Cameroon’s Forests in the Congo Basin. *J. Env. Develop.* **14**:317–337. [5]
- Pagdee, A., Y. Kim, and P. J. Daugherty. 2006. What Makes Community Forest Management Successful: A Meta-Study from Community Forests Throughout the World. *Soc. Nat. Resour.* **19**:33–52. [5]
- Pailler, S., R. Naidoo, N. D. Burgess, O. E. Freeman, and B. Fisher. 2015. Impacts of Community-Based Natural Resource Management on Wealth, Food Security and Child Health in Tanzania. *PLoS One* **10**:e0133252. [5]
- Pammolli, L., L. Magazzini, and M. Riccaboni. 2011. The Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D. *Nature Rev. Drug Disc.* **10**:428–438. [8]
- Pauly, D., V. Christensen, S. Guénette, et al. 2002. Towards Sustainability in World Fisheries. *Nature* **418**:689–695. [6]
- Perc, M., J. Gomez-Gardenes, A. Szolnoki, L. M. Floria, and Y. Moreno. 2013. Evolutionary Dynamics of Group Interactions on Structured Populations: A Review. *J. R. Soc. Interface* **10**:20120997. [12]
- Persha, L., A. Agrawal, and A. Chhatre. 2011. Social and Ecological Synergy: Local Rulemaking, Forest Livelihoods and Biodiversity Conservation. *Science* **331**:1606–1608. [5]
- Pettit, P., and R. Sugden. 1989. The Backward Induction Paradox. *J. Philos.* **86**:169–182. [3]
- Pollnac, R. B., B. R. Crawford, and M. L. G. Gorospe. 2001. Discovering Factors That Influence the Success of Community-Based Marine Protected Areas in the Visayas, Philippines. *Ocean Coast. Manage.* **44**:683–710. [6]
- Pollock, G. B., Cabrales, A., and S. W. Rissing. 2004. On Suicidal Punishment among *Acromyrmex versicolor* Co-Foundresses: The Disadvantage in Personal Advantage. *Evol. Ecol. Res.* **6**:891–917. [6]
- Pollock, M. R. 1967. Origin and Function of Penicillinase: A Problem in Biochemical Evolution. *Br. Med. J.* **4**:71–77. [9]
- Popat, R., D. M. Cornforth, L. McNally, and S. P. Brown. 2015. Collective Sensing and Collective Responses in Quorum-Sensing Bacteria. *J. R. Soc. Interface* **12**: [7]
- Poteete, A. R., and E. Ostrom. 2004. Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest Management. *Dev. Change* **35**:435–461. [5]
- . 2008. Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action in Natural Resource Management: Struggling to Build Large-N Databases Based on Qualitative Research. *World Dev.* **36**:176–195. [5]
- Pradelski, B. S. R., and H. P. Young. 2012. Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems. *Games Econ. Behav.* **75**:882–897. [3]

- Pravosudov, V. V., and T. C. Roth. 2013. Cognitive Ecology of Food Hoarding: The Evolution of Spatial Memory and the Hippocampus. *Annu. Rev. Ecol., Evol. Syst.* **44**:173–193. [11]
- Prediger, S., B. Vollan, and B. Herrmann. 2014. Resource Scarcity and Antisocial Behavior. *J. Public Econ.* **119**:1–9. [3]
- Pretty, J. 2003. Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources. *Science* **302**:1912–1914. [6]
- Price, P. W. 1980. Evolutionary Biology of Parasites. Monographs in Population Biology 15. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. [3]
- Raihani, N. J., A. Thornton, and R. Bshary. 2012. Punishment and Cooperation in Nature. *Trends Ecol. Evol.* **27**:288–295. [6]
- Rainey, P. B., N. Desprat, W. W. Driscoll, and X. X. Zhang. 2014. Microbes Are Not Bound by Sociobiology: Response to Kummerli and Ross-Gillespie (2013). *Evolution* **68**:3344–3355. [7]
- Rapoport, A., and A. M. Chamah. 1965. Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press. [3]
- Rasko, D. A., and V. Sperandio. 2010. Anti-Virulence Strategies to Combat Bacteria-Mediated Disease. *Nat. Rev. Drug Discov.* **9**:117–128. [7]
- Rasolofoson, R. A., P. J. Ferraro, C. N. Jenkins, and J. P. G. Jones. 2015. Effectiveness of Community Forest Management at Reducing Deforestation in Madagascar. *Biol. Conserv.* **184**:271–277. [5]
- Ratledge, C., and L. G. Dover. 2000. Iron Metabolism in Pathogenic Bacteria. *Annu. Rev. Microbiol.* **54**:881–941. [3]
- Read, A. F., S. J. Baigent, C. Powers, et al. 2015. Imperfect Vaccination Can Enhance the Transmission of Highly Virulent Pathogens. *PLoS Biol.* **13**:e1002198. [9]
- Read, A. F., and M. J. MacKinnon. 2008. Pathogen Evolution in a Vaccinated World. In: *Evolution in Health and Disease* (2nd edition), ed. S. C. Stearns and J. C. Koella, pp. 139–152. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. [9]
- Rendell, L., L. Fogarty, and K. N. Laland. 2010. Rogers’ Paradox Recast and Resolved: Population Structure and the Evolution of Social Learning Strategies. *Evolution* **64**:534–548. [3]
- Repka, J., and M. R. Gross. 1995. The Evolutionarily Stable Strategy under Individual Condition and Tactic Frequency. *J. Theor. Biol.* **176**:27–31. [12]
- Richerson, P. J., and R. Boyd. 2005. Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. [3]
- Richner, H., and P. Heeb. 1996. Communal Life: Honest Signaling and the Recruitment Center Hypothesis. *Behav. Ecol.* **7**:115–118. [11]
- Rieucou, G., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2009. Persuasive Companions Can Be Wrong: The Use of Misleading Social Information in Nutmeg Mannikin. *Behav. Ecol.* **20**:1217–1222. [11]
- Robinson, B. E., M. B. Holland, and L. Naughton-Treves. 2014. Does Secure Land Tenure Save Forests? A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship between Land Tenure and Tropical Deforestation. *Global Environ. Change* **29**:281–293. [5]
- Rogers, A. R. 1988. Does Biology Constrain Culture. *Am. Anthropol.* **90**:819–831. [3]
- Rohwer, S., and P. W. Ewald. 1981. The Cost of Dominance and Advantage of Subordination in a Badge Signalling System. *Evolution* **35**:441–454. [4]
- Ross-Gillespie, A., M. Weigert, S. P. Brown, and R. Kummerli. 2014. Gallium-Mediated Siderophore Quenching as an Evolutionarily Robust Antibacterial Treatment. *Evol. Med. Public Health* **2014**:18–29. [7]

- Roth, A. E. 2015. Who Gets What – and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. [10]
- Roth, A. E., and I. Erev. 1995. Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models. *Games Econ. Behav.* **8**:164–212. [2]
- Roux, D., O. Danilchanka, T. Guillard, et al. 2015. Fitness Cost of Antibiotic Susceptibility During Bacterial Infection. *Sci. Transl. Med.* **7**:297ra114. [8]
- Rudel, T. K., O. T. Coomes, E. Moran, et al. 2005. Forest Transitions: Towards a Global Understanding of Land Use Change. *Global Environ. Change* **15**:23–31. [5]
- Rudholm, N. 2002. Economic Implications of Antibiotic Resistance in a Global Economy. *J. Health Econ.* **21**:1071–1083. [8]
- Rumbaugh, K. P., S. P. Diggle, C. M. Watters, et al. 2009. Quorum Sensing and the Social Evolution of Bacterial Virulence. *Curr. Biol.* **19**:341–345. [7]
- Rutherford, S. T., and B. L. Bassler. 2012. Bacterial Quorum Sensing: Its Role in Virulence and Possibilities for Its Control. *Cold Spring Harb. Perspect. Med.* **2**:a012427. [7]
- Sachs, J. D., and A. M. Warner. 2001. The Curse of Natural Resources. *Eur. Econ. Rev.* **45**:827–838. [3]
- Safi, K., and G. Kerth. 2007. Natural History Miscellany: Comparative Analyses Suggest That Information Transfer Promoted Sociality in Male Bats in the Temperate Zone. *Am. Nat.* **170**:465–472. [12]
- Samuelson, L. 2001. Analogies, Adaptations and Anomalies. *J. Econ. Theory* **97**:320–367. [2]
- Sandoz, K. M., S. M. Mitzimberg, and M. Schuster. 2007. Social Cheating in *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* Quorum Sensing. *PNAS* **104**:15876–15881. [12]
- Schaller, G. B. 1972. The Serengeti Lion: A Study of Predator-Prey Relations. Wildlife Behavior and Ecology, No. 86. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. [3]
- Schuett, W., T. Tregenza, and S. R. X. Dall. 2010. Sexual Selection and Animal Personality. *Biol. Rev. Camb. Philos. Soc.* **85**:217–246. [11]
- Schuster, M., D. J. Sexton, S. P. Diggle, and E. P. Greenberg. 2013. Acyl-Homoserine Lactone Quorum Sensing: From Evolution to Application. *Annu. Rev. Microbiol.* **67**:43–63. [7]
- Selten, R., and P. Hammerstein. 1984. Gaps in Harley Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of Tit for Tat. *Behav. Brain Sci.* **7**:115–116. [3]
- Seppänen, J. T., J. T. Forsman, M. Mönkkönen, and R. L. Thomson. 2007. Social Information Use Is a Process across Space, Time and Ecology, Reaching Heterospecifics. *Ecology* **88**:1622–1633. [11]
- Sethi, R., and E. Somanathan. 1996. The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use. *Am. Econ. Rev.* **86**:766–788. [6]
- Shaw, R. C., and N. S. Clayton. 2013. Careful Cachers and Prying Pilferers: Eurasian Jays (*Garrulus glandarius*) Limit Auditory Information Available to Competitors. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **280**:20122238. [11]
- Shettleworth, S. J. 1990. Spatial Memory in Food-Storing Birds. *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B* **329**:143–151. [11]
- Sigel, S. P., S. Lanier, V. S. Baselski, and C. D. Parker. 1980. *In Vivo* Evaluation of Pathogenicity of Clinical and Environmental Isolates of *Vibrio cholerae*. *Infect. Immun.* **28**:681–687. [9]
- Silk, J. B. 1982. Altruism among Female *Macaca radiata*: Explanations and Analysis of Patterns of Grooming and Coalition-Formation. *Behaviour* **79**:162–188. [12]

- Simon, H. A. 1956. Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment. *Psychol. Rev.* **63**:129–138. [2]
- Singer, R. S., R. Finch, H. C. Wegener, et al. 2003. Antibiotic Resistance: The Interplay between Antibiotic Use in Animals and Human Beings. *Lancet Infect. Dis.* **3**:47–51. [8]
- Siroto, E. 2000. An Evolutionarily Stable Strategy for Aggressiveness in Feeding Groups. *Behav. Ecol.* **11**:351–356. [11]
- Skaperdas, S. 1996. Contest Success Functions. *J. Econ. Theory* **7**:283–290. [12]
- . 1998. On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests. *Public Choice* **96**:25–42. [12]
- Smith, J. 2001. The Social Evolution of Bacterial Pathogenesis. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **268**:61–69. [7]
- Stein, G. E. 2005. Antimicrobial Resistance in the Hospital Setting: Impact, Trends, and Infection Control Measures. *Pharmacotherapy* **25**:44S–54S. [9]
- Stephens, D. W. 1981. The Logic of Risk-Sensitive Foraging Preferences. *Anim. Behav.* **29**:628–629. [3]
- Stephens, P. A., A. F. Russell, A. J. Young, W. J. Sutherland, and T. H. Clutton-Brock. 2005. Dispersal, Eviction, and Conflict in Meerkats (*Suricata suricatta*): An Evolutionarily Stable Strategy Model. *Am. Nat.* **165**:120–135. [12]
- Sueur, C., A. J. King, L. Conradt, et al. 2011. Collective Decision-Making and Fission-Fusion Dynamics: A Conceptual Framework. *Oikos* **120**:1608–1617. [12]
- Sumaila, U. R., and C. J. Walters. 2005. Intergenerational Discounting: A New Intuitive Approach. *Ecol. Econ.* **52**:135–142. [6]
- Taylor, P. D., and L. B. Jonker. 1978. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics. *Math. Biosci.* **40**:145–156. [3]
- Taylor, T. B., A. M. Rodrigues, A. Gardner, and A. Buckling. 2013. The Social Evolution of Dispersal with Public Goods Cooperation. *J. Evol. Biol.* **26**:2644–2653. [9]
- Templeton, J. J., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 1995. Public Information Cues Affect the Scrounging Decisions of Starlings. *Anim. Behav.* **49**:1617–1626. [11]
- The malERA Consultative Group on Vector Control. 2011. A Research Agenda for Malaria Eradication: Health Systems and Operational Research. *PLoS Med* **8**:e1000397. [9]
- Thomas, S., M. Harding, S. C. Smith, et al. 2012. Cd24 Is an Effector of HIF-1 Driven Primary Tumor Growth and Metastasis. *Cancer Res.* **72**:5600–5612. [10]
- Tisdell, C. 1992. Exploitation of Techniques That Decline in Effectiveness with Use. *Public Finance* **37**:428–437. [8]
- Tóth, Z., V. Bókony, Á. Z. Lendvai, et al. 2009. Effects of Relatedness on Social-Foraging Tactic Use in House Sparrows. *Anim. Behav.* **77**:337–342. [4]
- Toyokawa, W., H. R. Kim, and T. Kameda. 2014. Human Collective Intelligence under Dual Exploration-Exploitation Dilemmas. *PLoS One* **9**:9. [12]
- Tracy, N. D., and J. W. Seaman. 1995. Properties of Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules. *J. Theor. Biol.* **177**:193–198. [3]
- Traxler, C. 2010. Social Norms and Conditionally Cooperative Tax Payers. *Eur. J. Polit. Econ.* **26**:89–103. [2]
- Tucker, A. W. 1983. The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler. *Two-Year Coll. Math. J.* **14**:228–232. [3]
- Tullock, G. 1967. Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. *Western Econ. J.* **5**:224–232. [3]

- Tullock, G. 1974. *The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution*. The Public Choice Society Book and Monograph Series. Blacksburg, VA: University Publications. [3]
- UN. 2015. *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. Secondary Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>. (accessed Aug. 18, 2016). [5]
- UNFCCC. 2015. Paris Agreement: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In. <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/109r01.pdf>. (accessed Aug. 20, 2016). [5]
- Uriarte, M., M. Pinedo-Vasquez, R. S. DeFries, et al. 2012. Depopulation of Rural Landscapes Exacerbates Fire Activity in the Western Amazon. *PNAS* **109**:21546–21550. [5]
- Vale, P. F., A. Fenton, and S. P. Brown. 2014. Limiting Damage during Infection: Lessons from Infection Tolerance for Novel Therapeutics. *PLoS Biol.* **12**(1):e1001769.
- Valone, T. J. 2007. From Eavesdropping on Performance to Copying the Behavior of Others: A Review of Public Information Use. *Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.* **62**:1–14. [11]
- Valone, T. J., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 1993. Patch Estimation by Group Foragers: What Information Is Used? *Anim. Behav.* **45**:721–728. [11]
- Vander Wall, S. B. 1990. *Food Hoarding in Animals*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. [11]
- van der Weele, J. 2012a. The Signaling Power of Sanctions in Social Dilemmas. *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* **28**(1):103–126. [2]
- . 2012b. Beyond the State of Nature: Introducing Social Interactions in the Economic Model of Crime. *Rev. Law Econ.* **8**:401–432. [2]
- Velicer, G. J., L. Kroos, and R. E. Lenski. 2000. Developmental Cheating in the Social Bacterium *Myxococcus xanthus*. *Nature* **404**:598–601. [12]
- Vickery, W. L., L.-A. Giraldeau, J. J. Templeton, D. L. Kramer, and C. A. Chapman. 1991. Producers, Scroungers, and Group Foraging. *Am. Nat.* **137**:847–863. [3, 4, 12]
- von Clausewitz, C. 1832/1968. *On War*, trans. J. J. Graham. Annotated Reprint of the Original (1832). London: Penguin Classics. [10]
- von Hunolstein, C., F. Scopetti, A. Efstratiou, and K. Engler. 2002. Penicillin Tolerance Amongst Non-Toxicogenic *Corynebacterium diphtheriae* Isolated from Cases of Pharyngitis. *J. Antimicrob. Chemother.* **50**:125–128. [9]
- Von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern. 1953. *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. Wiley Science Edition. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. [3]
- Wärneryd, K. 1998. Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization. *J. Public Econ.* **69**:435–450. [12]
- Weitzman, M. 1998. Why the Far-Distant Future Should Be Discounted at Its Lowest Possible Rate. *J. Environ. Econ. Manage.* **36**:201–208. [9]
- Welbergen, J. A., and N. B. Davies. 2009. Strategic Variation in Mobbing as a Front Line of Defense against Brood Parasitism. *Curr. Biol.* **19**:235–240. [12]
- West, P., J. Igoe, and D. Brockington. 2006a. Parks and People: The Social Impact of Protected Areas. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* **35**:251–277. [5]
- West, S. A., and A. Buckling. 2003. Cooperation, Virulence and Siderophore Production in Bacterial Parasites. *Proc. Roy. Soc. B* **270**:37–44. [3]

- West, S. A., S. P. Diggle, A. Buckling, A. Gardner, and A. S. Griffins. 2007a. The Social Lives of Microbes. *Annu. Rev. Ecol., Evol. Syst.* **38**:53–77. [7]
- West, S. A., and A. Gardner. 2013. Adaptation and Inclusive Fitness. *Curr. Biol.* **23**:R577–R584. [3]
- West, S. A., A. Gardner, D. M. Shuker, et al. 2006b. Cooperation and the Scale of Competition in Humans. *Curr. Biol.* **16**:1103–1106. [12]
- West, S. A., A. S. Griffin, and A. Gardner. 2007b. Evolutionary Explanations for Cooperation. *Curr. Biol.* **17**:R661–R672. [7, 12]
- . 2007c. Social Semantics: Altruism, Cooperation, Mutualism, Strong Reciprocity and Group Selection. *J. Evol. Biol.* **20**:415–432. [12]
- WHO. 2014. Antimicrobial Resistance: Global Report on Surveillance. Geneva: World Health Organization. [8]
- Wilén, J. E., and S. Msangi. 2003. Dynamics of Antibiotic Use: Ecological versus Interventionist Strategies to Manage Resistance to Antibiotics. In: *Battling Resistance to Antibiotics and Pesticides: An Economic Approach*, ed. R. Laxminarayan, pp. 17–41. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. [8, 9]
- Williams, G. C. 1966. *Adaptation and Natural Selection*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. [3]
- Williams, L. J., A. J. King, and C. Mettke-Hofmann. 2012. Colourful Characters: Head Colour Reflects Personality in a Social Bird, the Gouldian Finch, *Erythrura gouldiae*. *Anim. Behav.* **84**:159–165. [12]
- Wilson, E. O. 2005. Kin Selection as the Key to Altruism: Its Rise and Fall. *Soc. Res.* **72**:159–166. [10]
- Wolf, M., G. S. van Doorn, and F. J. Weissing. 2008. Evolutionary Emergence of Responsive and Unresponsive Personalities. *PNAS* **105**:15825–15830. [11]
- . 2011. On the Coevolution of Social Responsiveness and Behavioural Consistency. *Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B* **278**:440–448. [11]
- Wu, G. M., and L.-A. Giraldeau. 2005. Risky Decisions: A Test of Risk Sensitivity in Socially Foraging Flocks of *Lonchura punctulata*. *Behav. Ecol.* **16**:8–14. [3]
- Xavier, J. B., W. Kim, and K. R. Foster. 2011. A Molecular Mechanism That Stabilizes Cooperative Secretions in *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*. *Mol. Microbiol.* **79**:166–179. [7]
- Yamagishi, T. 1986. The Provision of Sanctioning Systems as a Public Good. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **51**:110–116. [10]
- Yamagishi, T., and N. Mifune. 2008. Does Shared Group Membership Promote Altruism? Fear, Greed, and Reputation. *Ration. Soc.* **20**:5–30. [12]
- Young, H. P. 2008. Social Norms. Secondary Social Norms. http://www.dictionarofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_S000466. (accessed Aug. 19, 2016). [6]
- Zenuto, R. R., and M. S. Fanjul. 2002. Olfactory Discrimination of Individual Scents in the Subterranean Rodent *Ctenomys talarum* (Tuco-Tuco). *Ethology* **108**:629–641. [12]
- Zhang, X. X., and P. B. Rainey. 2013. Exploring the Sociobiology of Pyoverdinin-Producing *Pseudomonas*. *Evolution* **67**:3161–3174. [7]
- Zhou, L., L. Slamti, C. Nielsen-LeRoux, D. Lereclus, and B. Raymond. 2014. The Social Biology of Quorum Sensing in a Naturalistic Host Pathogen System. *Curr. Biol.* **24**:2417–2422. [9]